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Abstract—Mobile Collaborative Internet Access (MCA) en-
ables mobile users to share their Internet through flexible
tethering arrangements. This can potentially make better use of
network resources. However, from a mobile network operator’s
(MNO’s) viewpoint, it can either reduce revenue or increase
congestion, and thus has been blocked by some MNOs in practice.
We propose a hybrid pricing framework for MNOs who charge
users separately for access and tethering. This scheme serves to
coordinate the tethering decisions of mobile users with MNO
network management objectives. We analyze the MNOs’ equi-
librium pricing strategies in both cooperative and competitive
scenarios. In the cooperative scenario, at the equilibrium, each
user’s cost is independent of any chosen tethering links. We
then characterize the optimal hybrid pricing strategies of MNOs
in this scenario. For the competitive scenario, we formulate
the MNOs’ competitive interactions as a pricing game, and we
show that MNO competition leads to equalized prices for users
if an equilibrium exists but does not guarantee its existence.
Both insights motivate a quantity competition game, which is
shown to guarantee an equilibrium. Simulation results show that
in scenarios of interest the proposed hybrid pricing schemes
can double both MNOs’ profit and users’ payoff and such
improvements increase with the degree of network heterogeneity.
Index Terms—Network economics, pricing, network optimiza-
tion, tethering, fog communications, cooperative communications,
user-provided networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Global mobile data traffic has been experiencing explosive
growth and is expected to reach 77.5 exabytes per month
by 2022, approximately a sevenfold increase over 2017 [2].
However, mobile network capacity is growing relatively slowly
[2], which results in a global mismatch of demand and supply.
On the other hand, the heterogeneity of networks and mobile
users leads to different types of mismatch even at the same
time and location. For example, one user may underutilize
network resources in a high-speed network, while another user,
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Fig. 1. Illustration of an Open-Garden-like MCA framework consisting of
two MNOs and six users.
connected to a separate overlapping network with less capacity
or higher load, may be underserved. This creates opportunities
for more effective resource allocation and sharing across
networks and users.
One approach to achieving more efficient network resource
utilization is the new paradigm of user-provided network
(UPN), in which users serve as micro-operators and provide
network connections (and resources) for others [3]. Examples
of UPNs include the services enabled by companies such as
Karma [4] and Open Garden [5]. Specifically, Open Garden
provides a mobile app enabling mobile devices to dynamically
form mesh networks (through Bluetooth and Wi-Fi direct
links) and flexibly tether data for each other to improve
Internet connections across users. The Open Garden enables
mobile multi-hop and multi-path connectivity sharing among
users and realizes mobile collaborative Internet access (MCA).
Fig. 1 illustrates an Open-Garden-like MCA service with 2
mobile network operators (MNOs) and 6 users, where MNO
1 and its subscribers are marked in blue and MNO 2 and its
subscribers are marked in red. In this example, user 3 has a
high data demand that cannot be satisfied by her 3G downlink.
In contrast, user 2 is connected via an underutilized 4G link.
User 3 therefore requests a tether to user 2.
Although MCA can improve the overall utilization of net-
work resources, MNOs have not been entirely supportive
of MCA and the forms of shared mobile Internet access
or tethering. This is mainly because MCA can effectively
exploit the diversity of users and network environments and
bridge heterogeneous networks, which may reduce revenue
to MNOs who charge high access prices and may increase
more congestions for MNOs who charge low access prices. In
other words, each user can exploit the MCA to download her
dedicated data on a low price downlink, reducing each MNO’s
profit. Consequently, AT&T in the US requested Google Play
to block its subscribers’ access to Open Garden [6].
Even before the emergence of MCA services such as Open
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2TABLE I
PARAMETERS OF EXAMPLE 1 (ALL UNITS IN $/GB)
MNO 1 2
Charge for Data Service 10 15
Operational Cost 5 11
Tethering Charge 2 −
Profit w/o Tethering 5 4
Profit w/ Tethering 5|7 0
User 1 2
Payment w/o Tethering 10 15
Payment w/ Tethering 10 12
Garden, MNOs deployed several methods to restrict tethering
(in the form of personal hotspots) among users belonging to
different MNOs, mainly by direct prohibition or imposing an
additional tethering fee. For example, the MNO au in Japan
charges about $5 per month for the tethering service [7]. In
the US, MNOs such as AT&T, Verizon Wireless, and Sprint
charge an additional $10-$30 per month for user tethering [8].
In the UK, some MNOs such as Virgin Mobile and iD Mobile
prohibit all forms of tethering [9], while some other MNOs
(such as Three) charge users an additional fee for upgrading
to data plans that allow tethering [10].
Inspired by existing tethering pricing policies, we propose
a hybrid pricing framework for MNOs to reconcile the con-
flicting objectives of MNOs and users of MCA. The key idea
is to separate the pricing for dedicated Internet access and
tethering access. Specifically, each MNO sets a usage-based
access price for each subscriber and an additional usage-based
tethering price associated with MCA. If a pricing scheme
accounts for such MCA dynamics and offers proper incentives
for users to properly load balance across MNOs, it can lead
to a mutual benefit for both the MNOs and users.
B. An Illustrative Example
Before presenting our solution and contributions, we first
provide an example to illustrate the proposed hybrid pricing
framework and how it differs from traditional pricing without
tethering. The key parameters are presented in Table I.
Example 1. Consider two MNOs offering Internet access
services to two neighboring users, respectively, as shown in
Fig. 2. Consider the following pricing scenarios:
• No Tethering: MNOs do not allow tethering. Therefore,
each user can only download data through her MNO.
• Tethering: MNO 1 charges user 1 a separate fee for data
tethering. Therefore, user 2 can access through user 1’s
cellular downlink at a lower cost. For the costs shown
in Table I, the tethering pricing scheme offers user 2
a discount of $3 per GB ($12 per GB instead of $15
per GB). MNO 1 receives a profit of $5/GB from user 1
and a profit of $7/GB from user 2. Therefore, the total
MNOs’ profit from user 2 with tethering (which is $7/GB)
is higher than that when there is no tethering (which
is $4/GB). This illustrates how the pricing scheme with
tethering can benefit both MNOs (as a whole) and users.
The preceding example also shows that an MNO’s profit
(such as the one of MNO 2) may decrease by allowing the
tethering scheme, as users (e.g., user 2) may suspend their
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the pricing scheme where no tethering is allowed (left)
and the proposed hybrid pricing framework (right) for an MCA network with
two MNOs and two users.
dedicated Internet access. This incentivizes MNOs either to
cooperate and share a higher total profit, or to engage in com-
petitive hybrid pricing strategies to attract more user traffic. An
example of such an MNO cooperation is the national roaming
service, where MNOs (e.g., Reliance and Vodafone in India)
provide mobile data service for other MNO’s subscribers [12].
Examples of MNO competition are more common and appear
where it is difficult for MNOs to cooperate due to, for example,
technical, policy, and market concerns.
Motivated by the preceding discussion, we ask the following
questions in this paper:
1) How would cooperative MNOs set hybrid prices for
access and tethering to maximize their total profit?
2) How would competitive MNOs set equilibrium hybrid
prices to maximize their own profits?
3) How does the introduction of hybrid pricing impact
MNOs’ profit and users’ surplus in both cooperative and
competitive scenarios?
C. Contributions
We consider a model with multiple MNOs and users, where
users share their Internet access through MCA and MNOs
adopt hybrid pricing schemes to charge each user separately
for Internet access and tethering. We assume MNOs choose
pricing policies over a slower time scale relative to the
rate at which users choose a dedicated MNO. Hence, we
model the interaction between MNOs and users as a two-
stage leader-follower (Stackelberg) game [13]. In Stage I , the
MNOs determine the access and tethering prices. Cooperative
MNOs decide their hybrid pricing schemes jointly to maximize
their total profit. We also consider a competitive scenario,
where each MNO maximizes its own profit. In Stage II, the
neighboring users cooperatively decide the amount of traffic
to download and to tether to maximize their total payoff.
The challenges of analyzing equilibria in both cooperative
and competitive scenarios mainly lie in the multiple ways in
which the users can configure their access connections, either
through direct access or tethered to another user. This com-
bined with coupled constraints make it difficult to characterize
users’ optimal decisions. The large space of user decisions and
interaction among MNOs’ pricing decisions further complicate
the competitive pricing scheme.
3TABLE II
SUMMARY OF KEY MODEL FEATURES
Scenario Formulation Key Features Existence of Equilibrium Section
Cooperative Optimization MNOs maximize their total profit
√
IV
Competitive Price Competition Game (PCG) MNOs compete on prices may not exist VQuantity Competition Game (QCG) MNOs compete on quantity outputs
√
VI
We summarize the key features of the scenarios studied in
Table II. Our main contributions follow.
• Hybrid Pricing Framework. We formulate the first model
for a hybrid pricing scheme for MCA. It reconciles the
conflicting objectives of MNOs and users in MCA.
• Cooperative Scheme. We first study hybrid pricing
schemes for cooperative MNOs. We show that the optimal
(MNO-profit-maximizing) scheme makes each user’s cost
independent of her selection of tethering links. This
allows a transformation of the challenging hybrid pricing
problem into a tractable one. We show a numerical
example in which the cooperative scheme approximately
doubles both MNOs’ profit and users’ payoff in a prac-
tical scenario of interest.
• Competitive Scheme. We then study equilibrium hy-
brid pricing with competitive MNOs. We formulate the
MNOs’ interactions as a Price Competition Game (PCG)
and show that in equilibrium prices are equalized across
different users. However, an equilibrium may not exist
in some cases. The equalized prices and non-existence
equilibrium motivate us to reformulate the price setting of
MNOs as a Quantity Competition Game (QCG). We show
that the QCG game always has (at least) an equilibrium
and approximates the PCG. Numerical results show that,
compared to the cooperative scheme, the competitive
scheme achieves slightly smaller MNO profits but much
larger user payoffs , in a heterogeneous network.
• Free-Tethering. We further study the scheme where teth-
ering is allowed without additional payment. Our ana-
lytical and numerical results show that pricing with free
tethering is nearly optimal for cooperative MNOs, when
users have similar cellular and tethering energy costs.
We organize the rest of paper as follows. In Section II,
we review related work. In Section III, we introduce the
system model and formulate the two-stage Stackelberg game.
We study the cooperative hybrid pricing scheme in Section
IV. We study two types of competitive interactions among
MNOs, including the PCG and the QCG, in Sections V and
VI, respectively. We present the numerical results in Section
VII. Finally, Section VIII presents conclusions.
II. RELATED WORKS
A. User Provided Networks
Several incentive mechanisms for the Open-Garden-like
MCA service have been proposed in [14]–[16]. Specifically, in
[14], Iosifidis et al. propose a distributed incentive mechanism
for encouraging MCA service. In [15], Syrivelis et al. design
a cloud-controlled MCA service and study a coalitional game
played among users. In [16], Georgiadis et al. study incen-
tive mechanisms for services exchange in general networks.
However, the preceding work does not consider the impact of
MCA on MNOs or the interactions among the MNOs.
There are also two related forms of UPN that have been
studied. The first is wireless community networks (e.g. FONs
[17]), where individuals share their private residential Wi-Fi
access points. Several existing works have considered pricing
and incentive design for UPN [18]. Afrasiabi et al. in [19]
propose a low introductory price policy to promote the service
adoption. Ma et al. in [20] study the user behavior analysis
and the MNOs’ pricing design. The second form is the Karma-
like UPN [4]. Specifically, Karma sells mobile devices (that
convert 4G cellular signals to Wi-Fi signals) to its subscribers
and encourages the subscribers to operate as Wi-Fi hotspots
and provide Internet access to non-subscribers. In [21], Gao et
al. propose a hybrid data pricing scheme motivated by Karma’s
UPN service, to incentivize users to operate as mobile Wi-Fi
hotspots and provide Internet access for other users without
direct Internet access. In [22], Khalili et al. further study the
user behavior dynamics and network evolution under such a
hybrid data pricing scheme. Substantially different from these
models, the MCA model allows users to concurrently share
flexible direct mobile Internet access.
B. Internet Access Pricing
Our hybrid pricing scheme is also motivated by related
work on topology-aware pricing schemes for wireless mesh
networks [25], [26] and cooperative communication networks
[27]. The focus of those studies is on pricing and incentive
issues for user cooperation, without considering tethering
pricing schemes.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. System Overview
MNOs and Users: We consider an MCA model with a set
N = {1, 2, ..., N} of MNOs and a set I = {1, 2, ..., I} of
users, as illustrated in Fig. 1. We assume each user subscribes
to only one MNO, which provides a mobile Internet access
service for each of its subscribers. Let In denote the set of
subscribers of MNO n, and let σ(i) denote the MNO to which
user i subscribes, i.e., i ∈ Iσ(i) for all i ∈ I.1
Cellular Links: For presentation clarity, we focus on the
downlink.2 Let Ci (MBps) be the maximum rate (capacity) that
user i ∈ I can achieve from his cellular downlink provided
by MNO σ(i).
1In Fig. 1, for example, MNO 2’s subscriber set is I2 = {3, 5, 6}, and
user 2 subscribes to MNO σ(2) = 1.
2 The uplink case is similar to the downlink, with minor changes such as
smaller uplink capacities. For the simultaneous downlink and uplink case,
a user’s coupled utility for both downloading and uploading significantly
complicates the modeling. Hence, it is left for future work.
4Wireless Mesh Network: The users cooperate and provide
an Open-Garden-like MCA service to each other. Specifically,
users form one wireless mesh network, where all users are
connected through Wi-Fi Direct.3 Therefore, there is a Wi-
Fi (tethering) link between each pair of users, which can
be a one-hop or multi-hop Wi-Fi Direct link. We assume
the Wi-Fi links have high capacities. Hence, the performance
bottleneck in the network is always the cellular links. Note
that we can equivalently treat a multi-hop connection as a
single-hop one in our model. This is because (i) a tethering
price (to be introduced) is independent of any relay in a multi-
hop connection, and (ii) the capacities of Wi-Fi links are
sufficiently high. Hence, we focus on the case where every
pair of users are single-hop neighbors for simplicity.
Time Period: We consider a time period (e.g. several hours
to a day) consisting of several time slots (e.g. several minutes
each). We consider a quasi-static mobility model, where each
user moves randomly across time slots, and remains at the
same location within each time slot. The link capacities are
considered constant during each time slot.
User Roles: In each time slot, each user can be a gateway,
or a client, or both. A gateway node downloads data directly
from its MNO, and a client node consumes data for some local
mobile applications.
MNO Cost: We consider a linear average operational cost
ei of MNO σ(i) for transmitting every GB to user i. Send-
ing traffic to different users may incur different operational
costs because of the different technologies (3G/LTE) and the
different channel conditions.
User Cost: We include a user’s energy cost ci←j per GB
for the data transfer over cellular downlink j and the Wi-Fi
Direct to user i, given by [28]
ci←j = cDownj + c
Wi-Fi
i←j , (1)
where cDownj denotes the energy cost per GB for user i
to download, and cWi-Fii←j includes the energy cost on Wi-Fi
Direct for each tethered GB. It captures the aggregate cost
experienced by tethering initiator (user j) and the tethering
recipient (user i).
B. Mobile Network Operators
Access Prices: Denote ai ≥ 0 as the access price ($/GB)
that MNO σ(i) charges user i. Here we allow the MNOs
to charge different prices to different users, based on users’
QoS requirements and network service types. Perfect price
differentiation among users leads to the maximum design
flexibility for the MNOs.4
Tethering Prices: We further consider a linear tethering
price, i.e., the MNOs can charge for each tethered GB in
addition to the basic data payment. Let ti←j denote the
tethering price ($/GB) that MNO σ(j) charges user j for each
3For the case where the users form more than one disjointed wireless mobile
network, an MNO can differentially price users in each wireless mesh network.
Thus, we can decompose the pricing problem at each wireless mesh network.
Therefore, it is enough to focus on one wireless mobile network.
4In practice, the MNOs may partially differentiate among users with a
limited number of prices [29]. An example of partial price differentiation is
the student discounts for mobile data plans offered by many MNOs [30].
TABLE III
NOTATION
Symbol Physical Meaning
In Set of MNO i’s subscribers
σ(i) MNO subscribed by user i
Ci Downlink capacity of user i
ei Operational cost over downlink i, borne by MNO σ(i)
ci←j Energy cost over link i← j, borne by users
xi←j Data downloaded by user j and tethered to user i
Ui(·) Utility function for user i
Vn(·) Profit function for MNO n
ai Access price over downlink i
ti←j Tethering price over link i← j
hi←j Hybrid price over link i← j
pi Delivered price for user i
J(·) Users’ total payoff
di(·) User i’s demand function
GB that user j tethers to user i. Note that the MNO can set
a negative tethering price, in which case MNO σ(j) will give
user j a discount of |ti←j | for the data tethered to user i. Here
we define ti←i , 0 for each i. We further allow the MNO to
differentiate not only the gateway users but also the clients,5
i.e., ti←j can be different for every i and j.
Hybrid Prices: Define h , {hi←j}i,j∈I as the hybrid price
matrix, where hi←j denotes the hybrid price that user j needs
to pay to her MNO, for each GB she tethers to user i. This
includes both the access price and the tethering price,
hi←j , aj + ti←j ≥ 0. (2)
Profit: With the preceding notation, MNO n’s profit is
Vn =
∑
j∈In
∑
i∈I
(hi←j − ej)xi←j , (3)
where xi←j is the user traffic (to be defined next).
C. Mobile Users
Traffic Matrix: Let xi←j ≥ 0 denote the data downloaded
by user j and tethered to user i (tethered data) if j 6= i, and the
data user i downloads for herself (directly downloaded data)
if j = i. We define x , {xi←j}i,j∈I as the traffic matrix.
Payoff: Let J(·) denote the users’ total payoff, given by
J (x;h) =
∑
i∈I
Ui
∑
j∈I
xi←j
−∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I
(hi←j + ci←j)xi←j ,
(4)
where Ui(·) is a positive, increasing, twice-continuously dif-
ferentiable, and strictly concave function of user i. The strict
concavity indicates that users have the diminishing marginal
satisfaction of additional data consumption.
We summarize notations in Table III.
D. Two-Stage Stackelberg Game
MNOs decide the hybrid prices for each time period at the
beginning of the entire time period, and users decide the data
traffic in each time slot. Since pricing is independent across
different time slots, we focus on one time slot.
5In practice, to charge/block tethering data, MNOs may adopt different
techniques to detect whether and for whom a user is tethering, such as
inspecting MAC addresses and network packets for TTLs [31].
5Stage I
The MNOs cooperatively specify the hybrid price h.
⇓
Stage II
The users cooperatively specify the traffic x.
Fig. 3. Two-Stage Stackelberg Game with cooperative MNOs.
We model the interaction between MNOs and users as a
two-stage Stackelberg game, as illustrated in Fig. 3. Specifi-
cally, in Stage I, the MNOs simultaneously decide the hybrid
price matrix h. In Stage II, the users simultaneously decide
the traffic matrix x.
Note that, in Stage II, users only participate in the MCA if
they receive higher payoffs than not participating. Such user
cooperation can be achieved with a self-enforcing bargaining
mechanism as in [14]. Such a mechanism can maximize the
aggregate user payoff. The aggregate payoff can be fairly
shared among users through proper money transfer by solving
the corresponding Nash bargaining problem [14]. For the
purpose of designing an MNO’s hybrid pricing scheme, it is
enough to focus on optimizing the users’ traffic x through
solving the users’ payoff maximization problem (without
considering how users decide their money transfers).
In Stage I, we consider two sets of models where the MNOs
are cooperative and competitive, respectively. We assume that
the cooperative MNOs jointly choose the hybrid pricing matrix
to maximize their total profit. Each competitive MNO sets the
data and tethering prices to maximize its own profit.
IV. COOPERATIVE HYBRID PRICING
In this section, motivated by existing MNO cooperation (e.g.
national roaming [12]), we consider the scenario in which
MNOs cooperatively determine prices.6 Specifically, MNOs
cooperatively decide the hybrid price matrix h to maximize
their total profit in Stage I, and users cooperatively determine
the traffic in Stage II.
We will derive the (subgame perfect) equilibrium by back-
ward induction, i.e., given the hybrid pricing matrix h, we
characterize the users’ traffic decision x∗(h) that maximizes
the users’ total payoff in Stage II, and then we characterize
the MNOs’ optimal hybrid pricing matrix h∗ that maximizes
the MNOs’ profit.
A. Users’ Consumption Decisions in Stage II
We first formulate the Users’ Payoff Maximization (UPM)
problem and then characterize the optimal traffic under the
equilibrium hybrid price matrix h∗ along with several struc-
tural results.
6Similar to the users cooperation, the MNO cooperation is achievable by a
bargaining mechanism, since each MNO can be better off by participating in
such a mechanism.
1) UPM: Under an arbitrary hybrid price matrix h, we
formulate (UPM) as
(UPM) max
x
∑
i∈I
Ui(∑
l∈I
xi←l
)
−
∑
j∈I
(hi←j + ci←j)xi←j

(5a)
s.t.
∑
l∈I
xl←j ≤ Cj , ∀j ∈ I, (5b)
xi←j ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ I. (5c)
Constraint (5b) indicates that the sum of user j’s direct rate
and the rate tethered to other users cannot exceed the capacity
of her downlink Cj . Let x∗(h) denote the solution to the
(UPM) Problem in (5), given hybrid price matrix h.
Here we user λ , {λi}i∈I and µ , {µi←j}i,j∈I to denote
the dual variables corresponding to constraints (5b) and (5c),
respectively. The dual variable λi is also known as the shadow
price for downlink i. We will explain the properties of these
dual variables next.
2) Analysis under Equilibrium Hybrid Prices: In the fol-
lowing, we assume the MNOs’ set the equilibrium price matrix
h∗ (of the entire two-stage game) and derive structural prop-
erties concerning both users’ decision x∗(h∗) and the MNOs’
equilibrium price matrix h∗. These significantly simplify the
solution in both Stage I and Stage II. The proofs of all
theorems, corollaries, propositions, and lemmata can be found
in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. Under MNOs’ equilibrium hybrid price matrix
h∗, the optimal shadow price satisfies λ∗j = 0, j ∈ I.
The intuition behind Theorem 1 is that if λ∗j > 0 for some
downlink j, then the MNOs can increase the hybrid price hi←j
on downlink j for all i to increase their profit.
To uniquely specify the MNOs’ equilibrium hybrid pricing
scheme, we make an additional assumption in Assumption 1.
The reason is that if there exist downlinks j 6= k such that
hi←j+ci←j = hi←k+ci←k, (UPM) is not strictly convex and
hence there may be more than one globally optimal solution.
This implies that the MNOs’ total profit may not be unique
for a given h. Hence, we adopt the following assumption in
the rest of the paper:
Assumption 1. The users select their traffic decision x∗ such
that7
x∗ = arg min
x∈Xo
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I
(ej + ci←j)xi←j , (6)
where X o denotes the set of all x that solves (UPM) in (5).
We will later show in Section IV-B that Assumption 1
ensures that the x∗ satisfying (6) corresponds to a solution
that MNOs want users select among X o, hence induces a
unique MNO profit. Moreover, Assumption 1 incurs no loss
of generality as MNOs can always slightly adjust h to ensure
that users select the x∗ satisfying (6).
From Theorem 1 and Assumption 1, we can derive the
equilibrium price matrix h∗.
7Note that we will show that through solving their optimal cooperative
pricing, the MNOs can compute and send the users’ optimal traffic decision
that satisfies (6) to the users, without the need for the users to know {ej}j∈I .
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Fig. 4. An α-fair utility function U(x) = x1−α/(1 − α) and the
corresponding demand function d(p) = (1/p)1/α.
Corollary 1. There exists an equilibrium price matrix h∗ such
that for each user i, we have
h∗i←j + ci←j = h
∗
i←k + ci←k, ∀j, k ∈ I. (7)
Corollary 1 suggests that one of the equilibrium price
solutions for the MNOs is gateway-independent, i.e., each
user faces the same sum cost across different links (the traffic
cost hi←j plus the energy cost ci←j).8 This motivates us to
combine the hybrid price hi←j and the energy cost ci←j into
a single delivered price pi.
Definition 1. The delivered price pi for each user i is
pi , hi←j + ci←j , ∀j ∈ I. (8)
Therefore, to optimize over the price matrix h, it is enough
to optimize the delivered price vector p , {pi}i∈I and then
recover the hybrid price matrix by hi←j = pi − ci←j for all
i, j ∈ I.
To summarize, the equilibrium shadow price is zero (The-
orem 1) and the equilibrium delivered price pi is gateway-
independent (Corollary 1). Therefore, we can define a demand
function for the user traffic.
Definition 2. Given the delivered price pi, user i’s one-
dimensional demand function is
di(pi) ,
∑
j∈I
x∗i←j(h
∗) = arg max
x≥0
[Ui(x)− xpi]. (9)
Since Ui(x) is strictly concave, U ′i(x) is decreasing, and
di(·) is unique-valued and non-increasing. We present an
illustrative example of a utility function and the corresponding
demand function in Fig. 4. By the first-order condition in (9),
the demand function satisfies
U ′i(di(p
∗
i )) ≥ p∗i with equality if di(p∗i ) > 0. (10)
Proposition 1. At an equilibrium, user i has a positive demand
if and only if U ′i(0) > minj [ci←j + ej ].
The proof shows that if user i’s marginal utility is too small,
then MNOs cannot profit from serving user i.
By Proposition 1, we can remove all users i with U ′i(0) ≤
minj [ci←j + ej ] from the set I. In other words, without loss
of generality, we can assume that U ′i(0) > minj [ci←j + ej ]
for all users in the set I. Therefore, equality in (10) always
holds. We thus have the following definition:
Definition 3 (Inverse Demand Function). User i’s inverse
demand function is her marginal utility function U ′i(·).
8Different users may still face different sum costs.
TABLE IV
EXAMPLES OF UTILITY FUNCTIONS SATISFYING ASSUMPTION 2
Name Utility Function Ref.
α-fair x1−α/(1− α), α ∈ [0, 1) [35], [36]
logarithmic θ log(a+ x), θ > 0, a ≥ 0 [14]
exponential 1− exp(−θx), 0 ≤ θ ≤ 2/∑i∈I Ci [37]
quadractic ax2 + bx, 0 ≤ −2a∑i∈I Ci ≤ b [37]
We next show that it is enough for MNOs to optimize their
total profit based on the delivered price and the users’ inverse
demand functions.
B. Cooperative MNOs
In this subsection, we derive the cooperative pricing scheme
to maximize MNOs’ total profit by problem transformations.
1) Operator Profit Maximization (OPM): Given x∗(h)
derived in Stage II, we can derive the optimal hybrid pricing
matrix h∗ by solving (OPM) in Stage I,
(OPM) max
h
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I
(hi←j − ej)x∗i←j(h) (11a)
s.t. hi←j ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ I (11b)
2) Revised OPM (R-OPM): Define MNO σ(j)’s delivered
(operational) cost as e˜i←j = ej + ci←j for each GB user j
tethers to user i. We can transform (OPM) into a new problem
where the traffic x are the optimization variables. The key
idea is to exploit the gateway-independent pricing suggested
by Corollary 1. It allows us to further adopt the inverse demand
function U ′i(·) to determine the delivered price. We have
(R−OPM) max
x
∑
j∈I
∑
i∈I
(
U ′i
(∑
l∈I
xi←l
)
− e˜i←j
)
xi←j
(12a)
s.t.
∑
l∈I
xl←j ≤ Cj , xi←j ≥ 0,∀i, j. (12b)
The objective in (R-OPM) in (12) may not be concave in
general, which may make it difficult to find a globally optimal
solution to (R-OPM).9 We denote
Pi(x) = −xU
′′′
i (x)
U ′′i (x)
, ∀i ∈ I. (13)
In the economics literature, U ′′′i (x) stands for user i’s pru-
dence and Pi(x) is the coefficient of relative prudence [34].
We use it to measure the concavity of user i’s marginal utility
(or the inverse demand function). We introduce the following
assumption to ensure the convexity of (R-OPM):
Assumption 2. Each user i’s coefficient of relative prudence
satisfies Pi(x) ≤ 2, for any x ≥ 0 and any i ∈ I.
Assumption 2 is satisfied by a wide range of utility func-
tions, some of which are listed in Table IV. We can readily
verify that U ′i(x)x is concave if and only if Assumption 2
holds. Therefore, (R-OPM) is convex, which can be easily
solved by convex optimization solvers such as CVX [38].
9Some of the results in this section only apply to the case where MNOs
set optimal prices. Since (R-OPM) is not convex, we may obtain a locally
optimal solution. In this case, those results do not hold.
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Input : {Ui(·)}i∈I , {e˜i←j}i,j∈I , {Ci}i∈I
Output: Equilibrium hybrid price matrix h∗ and
equilibrium traffic matrix x∗(h(p∗))
1 The MNOs obtain xR via solving (R-OPM);
2 The MNOs obtain the optimal delivered price vector p∗
from (14) and then the optimal hybrid price matrix h∗
from (8);
3 The MNOs send users the optimal traffic decision
x∗(h(p∗)) = xR;
Theorem 2 (Equivalence of (R-OPM) and (OPM)). For any
optimal solution xR to (R-OPM),
1) the optimal delivered price vector p∗ = {p∗i }i∈I in (8)
is, for each user i,
p∗i = U
′
i
∑
j∈I
xRi←j
 ; (14)
2) given p∗ in (14), xR is the optimized user traffic, i.e,
x∗(h(p∗)) = xR.
The significance of Theorem 2 is two-fold. First, we can
solve (R-OPM) efficiently and then use (14) to obtain the
optimal delivered price vector p∗ and then the optimal hybrid
price matrix h∗ by (8). Second, it implies that MNOs can
directly send the solution to (R-OPM) xR to users, without the
need to let users independently solve (UPM).10 We summarize
this procedure in Algorithm 1.
C. Cooperative MNOs with Free Tethering
In this subsection, we further consider a free-tethering (FT)
cooperative pricing scheme when there is a strict regulation
on the tethering pricing [11]. Specifically, the tethering price
satisfies ti←j = 0 for all users i and j, and the MNOs
optimize the access prices. Due to the space limit, we present
the detailed descriptions in Appendix F.
We show that such an FT scheme can lead to the optimal
prices under some conditions on users’ utility and energy cost.
Corollary 2. The optimized FT scheme corresponds to the
optimal hybrid pricing to the OPM Problem in (11) when both
of the following conditions are satisfied:
1) Users’ energy costs for Wi-Fi links are zero and those
for cellular downlinks are the same, i.e., cWi-Fii←j = 0 and
cDowni = c
Down
j for all i, j ∈ I.
2) Each user i has an isoelastic utility, i.e., Ui(x) =
θix
1−α+Ξi
1−α (with θi and Ξi being non-negative and
α ∈ [0, 1)).11
Condition 1) is justified by measurements showing that the
average energy cost on Wi-Fi Direct cWi-Fii←j is much less than
10This is possible as we have considered the complete information setting
in this paper, i.e., MNOs know the users’ utility functions. This is reasonable
as the users’ mobile application information (i.e., whether the user is watching
YouTube or downloading emails) is often communicated to the MNOs by the
devices.
11The widely used α-fair utility function in Table IV is a special subclass
of this class of functions.
Stage I (Price Competition Game)
Each MNO n competitively sets its hybrid prices hn.
⇓
Stage II
The users cooperatively specify the traffic decision x.
Fig. 5. Two-Stage Stackelberg Game for the PCG.
that for cellular connections cDownj [28]. Moreover, the traffic
cost in general is much larger than energy cost for users.
We explain Corollary 2 as follows. When condition 1)
is satisfied, Proposition 1 implies that gateway-independent
pricing requires a∗i = a
∗
j + t
∗
i←j . In addition, the weighted
α-fair utility function exhibits a constant price elasticity of
demand, i.e., heterogeneous users’ (in terms of θi and bi)
responses to the delivered price are similar. This equalizes the
optimal delivered prices across heterogeneous users. Hence,
we have p∗i = p
∗
j and thus t
∗
i←j = 0.
V. COMPETITIVE MNOS: PRICE COMPETITION
We now analyze the MNOs and users’ decisions in the
competitive MNOs models. In Stage I, each MNO sets hy-
brid prices independently to maximize its own profit. Hence,
MNOs participate in a price competition game (PCG). In Stage
II, the users cooperatively determine traffic. Fig. 5 summarizes
the interactions among competitive MNOs and users.
Introducing competition among MNOs increases the diffi-
culty of analysis. This is because, each MNO needs to consider
users’ multi-dimensional decisions and also the hybrid pricing
strategies of other MNOs. For analytical tractability, we adopt
the following assumption in the rest of this paper:
Assumption 3. User energy costs for the Wi-Fi links are zero,
i.e., cWi-Fii←j = 0 for all i, j ∈ I.
As previously discussed, the energy cost on a Wi-Fi link
cWi-Fii←j is typically much less than that for cellular connections
cDownj and the traffic cost. By Assumption 3, we have ci←j =
ck←j and e˜i←j = e˜k←j for all i, k ∈ I. Thus, we drop the
index i in ci←j and e˜i←j and have cj and e˜j .
Similar to the cooperative-MNO scenario, we will derive the
equilibrium by backward induction, i.e., given the hybrid pric-
ing matrix h, we characterize the users’ traffic decision x?(h)
in Stage II. We then characterize each MNO’s equilibrium
prices. We next formally define the PCG and its corresponding
equilibrium:
Game 1 (PCG). Price Competition Game consists of
• Players: the set N of MNOs.
• Strategies: hn , {hi←j}i∈I,j∈In .
• Payoffs: for each MNO n:
Vn(h) =
∑
j∈In
∑
i∈I
(hi←j − e˜j)x?i←j(h), (15)
where x?i←j(h) is the traffic optimized in Stage II as derived
in Section IV.
Let ? denote the competitive equilibrium values, to differ-
entiate from the cooperative equilibrium values denoted by ∗.
8Definition 4. A price competitive equilibrium (PCE) for the
PCG is a hybrid price matrix h? such that, for every MNO n,
Vn(h
?) ≥ Vn(hn,h?−n), ∀hn. (16)
A. Users’ Consumption Decisions in Stage II
Similar to the interaction in Stage II for the cooperative-
MNO model, the users cooperatively optimize x by solving
(UPM) in (5) for a given h.
The PCG shares part of the equilibrium results with the
cooperative hybrid pricing scheme. Specifically, Theorem 1
also holds in the PCG. That is, for each downlink j, the
equilibrium shadow price is zero, i.e., λ?j = 0 for all j ∈ I.
Therefore, similar to Corollary 1, we can prove the following
gateway independence result in a similar way:
Proposition 2 (Gateway Independence). If a PCE h˜? exists,
there exists a PCE h? such that
• h? is gateway-independent, i.e., for each user i,
h?i←j + cj = h
?
i←k + ck, ∀j, k ∈ I; (17)
• every MNO n receives the same profit with h? and h˜?,
i.e., Vn(h˜?) = Vn(h?).
Proposition 2 implies that among all possible PCEs, it is
enough to focus on the gateway-independent ones. Let p? =
{p?i }i∈I denote the equilibrium delivered price vector, i.e.,
p?i , h?i←j + cj , ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ I. (18)
The gateway-independent PCE indicates that we can adopt
the one-dimensional demand function di(p?i ) defined in (9) to
characterize each user’s traffic decision.
B. MNOs’ Price Competition in Stage I
In this subsection, we study the interactions among MNOs
through price competition. We sort the delivered costs {e˜j}
in ascending order without loss of generality, i.e., e˜1 < e˜2 <
... < e˜j .12 The indices will denote the corresponding channels.
Definition 5 (Market Clearing Price). We define ζs as the
market clearing (delivered) price for the first s channels,
which satisfies
∑
i∈I di(ζs) =
∑s
`=1 C` for all s ∈ I.
Given a fixed s, the market clearing price ζs denotes the
delivered price under which the users’ aggregate demand of
the first s downlinks is equal to the total capacity of these
downlinks. Since di(·) is decreasing, ζs also decreases in s
for a proper value of s. We will show that the delivered prices
at a PCE are given by a market clearing price. By exploiting
the continuity and strict concavity of Ui(·), we can prove:
Lemma 1. There exists a unique ζs for every s ∈ I.
To characterize PCEs, we further define the following
Definition 6 (Threshold Downlink). The threshold downlink
gthr is the downlink with the smallest delivered cost among all
MNOs other than MNO σ(1), i.e., gthr , arg mini∈I/Iσ(1) e˜i.
12Here, we assume that all downlinks have different delivered costs, since
the probability of two parameters being exactly the same is zero.
Note that MNO σ(1) is the most competitive MNO, in the
sense that it possesses the downlink with the least delivered
cost. In this sense, σ(gthr) can be considered the second most
competitive MNO.13 Thus, the delivered cost of the threshold
downlink e˜gthr measures how competitive MNO σ(gthr) is. As
we will show, a large e˜gthr implies MNO σ(gthr) offers little
competition, in which case MNO σ(1) effectively monopolizes
the market. Otherwise, MNO σ(1) shares the market with at
least MNO σ(gthr).
The following definition characterizes an MNO which cap-
tures a positive market share at a PCE.
Definition 7 (Traffic-Supporting MNO). An MNO n is traffic-
supporting at a PCE if some downlinks of users subscribing
to MNO n are active, i.e.,
∑
j∈In
∑
i∈I xi←j(h
?) > 0.
We characterize the PCEs as follows:
Proposition 3. If a PCE exists in a PCG, then it belongs to
one of the following two types:
• Single-Operator PCE: when the threshold downlink’s
delivered cost is high, i.e., ζgthr−1 ≤ e˜gthr , there exists
a unique gateway-independent PCE. Such a PCE admits
only one traffic-supporting MNO and satisfies p?i ≤ e˜gthr
for all i ∈ I;
• Multi-Operator PCE: when the threshold downlink’s de-
livered cost is low, i.e., ζgthr−1 > e˜gthr , a PCE (if
any) admits more than one traffic-supporting MNOs and
satisfies p?i ≥ e˜gthr for all i ∈ I.
The intuition is that when the delivered cost of the threshold
downlink is so high that no other MNO than MNO σ(1) is
competitive, then MNO σ(1) monopolizes the market. On the
other hand, if the delivered cost of the threshold downlink is
low enough, then at least MNO σ(gthr) competes with MNO
σ(1). Through this observation, we further characterize the
two types of PCEs according to the relation between ζgthr−1
and e˜gthr .
1) Single-Operator Equilibrium (ζgthr−1 ≤ e˜gthr ): In this
case, MNO σ(1) acts as a monopolist and is the only traffic-
supporting MNO. To characterize the equilibrium price, let
us first consider a monopolist delivered price vector p˜? =
{p˜?i }i∈I which is equivalent to the cooperative pricing scheme
and thus can be obtained by solving (OPM) via Algorithm 1.
The relation between the monopolist delivered price p˜?i and
the delivered costs are given in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. When ζgthr−1 ≤ e˜gthr , there exists a unique
gateway-independent equilibrium delivered price p?i such that,
for each user i,
p?i =
{
p˜?i , if p˜
?
i < e˜gthr (perfect monopoly),
e˜gthr , if p˜
?
i ≥ e˜gthr (depressed monopoly).
(19)
That is, MNO σ(1) adopts the monopoly delivered price
p˜?i for user i when p˜
?
i is sufficiently low, since no other
MNOs has a downlink cost low enough to compete with
MNO σ(1) for this user. However, MNO σ(gthr) competes
13MNO σ(gthr) may not be MNO σ(2), since the user 2 may be MNO
σ(1)’s subscriber, i.e., σ(1) = σ(2) 6= σ(gthr).
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Fig. 6. Characterizations (in terms of different capacity combinations) of the
PCE existence conditions for an example with two MNOs and two users.
with MNO 1 when the monopoly delivered price p˜?i exceeds
e˜gthr . Therefore, although MNO σ(1) is still the only traffic-
supporting MNO, the equilibrium delivered price is e˜gthr for
user i due to competition from MNO σ(gthr).
2) Multi-Operator Equilibrium (ζgthr−1 > e˜gthr): In con-
trast with the single-operator case, a PCE may not exist when
ζgthr−1 > e˜gthr . We will characterize the necessary condition
for the multi-operator PCE, based on which we discuss the
reason why a multi-operator PCE may not exist.
Definition 8 (Critical Downlink). The critical downlink sˆ is
the downlink such that ζsˆ satisfies:{
e˜sˆ ≤ ζsˆ ≤ e˜sˆ+1, if sˆ < |I|
e˜sˆ ≤ ζsˆ, if sˆ = |I|
, (20)
where ζs is the market clearing price in Definition 5.
Since ζs decreases in s, and e˜s increases in s, there is at
most one ζsˆ satisfying (20).14 The following theorem states
that the equilibrium delivered prices clear the first sˆ downlinks.
Theorem 3 (User Independence and Uniqueness). When
ζgthr−1 > e˜gthr , if a PCE exists, there exists a unique
equilibrium delivered price vector p? such that p?i = ζsˆ for
all i ∈ I.
By Theorem 3, the gateway-independent delivered prices
are also user-independent, i.e., the delivered prices are equal
across different users. Specifically, suppose the delivered price
for one user i is higher than that of another user k. Some
traffic-supporting MNO n can always slightly decrease its
hybrid price for user i but slightly increase the price for user
k. This can attract traffic demanded by users who will pay
a higher price, and hence increases its profit. Uniqueness is
mainly because there is at most one sˆ as we have mentioned.
Theorem 3 only states the necessary condition of a multi-
operator PCE. That is, a PCE may not exist (with an example
presented in Appendix L). As an illustration, next we charac-
terize the PCE existence conditions for a simple example.
3) Simple Example: It is difficult to completely characterize
a multi-operator PCE, due to the complexity of the multi-
dimensional strategy that each MNO has to determine. We
14 For example, when e˜1 = 0.1, e˜2 = 0.6, and ζ1 = 0.5, we have sˆ = 1.
Note that it is possible that sˆ does not exist. An example is an MCA with
two users with e˜1 = 0.1, e˜2 = 0.6, ζ1 = 1, and ζ2 = 0.5. We see that sˆ
cannot be 1 or 2. In such a case, no pricing profile can satisfy the necessary
condition in Proposition 3, implying that there is no PCE.
hence characterize the existence conditions (in terms of C1
and C2) for a system with two MNOs and two users, as shown
in Fig. 6. We set e˜1 < e˜2 (so that σ(1) = 1 and σ(gthr) = 2).
It follows
• One gateway-independent single-operator PCE lies in the
region with a large enough C1. This corresponds to a
sufficient small ζ1 such that ζ1 ≤ e˜2.
• One gateway-independent multi-operator PCE lies in the
region with small enough C1 and C2. This leads to a
sufficiently large ζ2 such that ζ2 ≥ e˜2.
• There is a large region for no PCE. This is consistent
with the well-known Edgeworth paradox in economics
[39]. That is, the situation where MNO 1 monopolizes the
market is not an equilibrium as ζ1 is too high. Nor is the
situation where both MNOs charge the delivered prices
that fully utilize their capacities (satisfying Theorem 3).
This is because ζ2 is so low that at least one MNO is
willing to increase its prices to generate more profits.
Due to space limitations, we present the detailed analysis in
Appendix M.
Similar to Section IV-C, we also derive conditions under
which the gateway-independent PCE h? leads to zero tethering
prices, as shown in Appendix N.
Regarding the multi-operator PCE, the induced user-
independent delivered prices and the possible non-existence
of PCE motivate us to reformulate the MNO competition as a
quantity game.
VI. COMPETITIVE MNOS: QUANTITY COMPETITION
In this section, we consider an alternative way for modeling
a multi-operator PCE. Specifically, we introduce the Quantity
Competition Game (QCG). We show that there exists at least
an equilibrium for the QCG. Moreover, a multi-operator PCE,
if exists, is exactly an equilibrium outcome of the QCG. We
then propose an algorithm to compute the equilibrium.
A. Quantity Competition Game
Uniform Delivered Price: A multi-operator PCE equalizes
the delivered prices across users and downlinks but may not
exist. This fact motivates us to reformulate MNOs’ interactions
into quantity competition based on the uniform delivered
pricing. Specifically, each MNO n decides its quantity (total
output traffic) qn of all its downlinks and compete with each
other.15 Given these quantity choices, they follow a uniform
delivered price pi(·) which adjusts to the level that users’
aggregate demands D(p) =
∑
i∈I di(p) is equal to the MNOs’
aggregate output, i.e., pi(·) , D−1(·), where f−1(·) denotes
the inverse function of f(·).
Aggregate Delivered Cost: MNO n can choose the output
zi for each downlink i ∈ In. However, due to the uniform
delivered price, we can see that MNO n should always fully
utilizes its low delivered cost downlinks first before providing
15To realize the output control in practice, each MNO can manipulate the
maximum data access speed of each downlink by setting a data speed cap.
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data at high delivered cost downlinks. Hence, we can derive
the aggregate delivered (operational) cost as
En(qn) , min{zi}i∈In
∑
i∈In
zie˜i, s.t.
∑
i∈In
zi = qn. (21)
Smoothed Approximation: The above En(qn) contains sev-
eral non-differentiable points. For analytical tractability, we
replace it with an approximation E˜n(qn), which smooths
En(qn) in the neighborhood of every non-differentiable point
q¯ ∈ Dn, where Dn denotes the set of non-differentiable points.
An example of such a smoothed function E˜n(qn) is
E˜n(qn) =

En(qn), if ∀q¯ ∈ Dn, qn /∈ (q¯ − ε, q¯ + ε),
En(q¯ − ε) + En(q¯+ε)−En(q¯−ε)8ε3 (qn − q¯ − ε)3,
if ∃q¯ ∈ Dn, qn ∈ (q¯ − ε, q¯ + ε).
(22)
We can see lim→0 E˜n(qn) → En(qn). Different from
En(qn), the new function E˜n(qn) admits a continuous second
order derivative. We formally define
Game 2 (QCG). The Quantity Competition Game consists of
• Players. MNO n ∈ N .
• Strategy space. MNO n chooses its quantity qn (its total
traffic to download) from Qn ,
[
0,
∑
i∈In Ci
]
.
• Payoff function. Each MNO n has
Vn
qn,∑
` 6=n
q`
 = qnpi(∑
`∈N
q`
)
− E˜n(qn). (23)
Accordingly, we introduce the definition of the Quantity
Competition Equilibrium (QCE) for the QCG in the following.
Definition 9 (QCE). A QCE for the QCG is a quantity profile
q? , {q?n}n∈N such that, for each MNO n,
Vn
q?n,∑
` 6=n
q?`
 ≥ Vn
qn,∑
` 6=n
q?`
 ,∀qn ∈ Qn. (24)
We show that
Proposition 5. The limit of a QCE (as  approaches 0) with a
smoothed approximation (in (22)) is a QCE without one (i.e.,
the QCE with En(qn) in (23)).
We focus on the smoothed approximation (with  approach-
ing 0) of the aggregate cost functions in the following.
B. Equilibrium Properties
In this subsection, we introduce a simple one-dimensional
mapping to facilitate characterizing and computing the QCE.
We then analyze the properties of the QCE, including exis-
tence, a sufficient condition for uniqueness, and equivalence
to a multi-operator PCE.
Notice that each MNO n’s profit is simply a function of two
valuables, i.e., its output qn and the sum of the total output∑
n∈N qn. Since all MNOs’ profit functions share the same
latter valuable, we adopt the following functions as a simpler
equivalent characterization of the QCE:16
ϕn(b) , arg max
qn∈Qn
[
qnpi(b) +
q2n
2
pi′(b)− E˜n(qn)
]
, (25)
and Φ(b) ,
∑
n∈N
ϕn(b). (26)
Function ϕn(b) corresponds to MNO n’s optimal output given
the total output b. Variable b can represent the QCE total output
if it is a fixed point of Φ(b) as we will show.
We adopt the following assumption:
Assumption 4. MNOs’ aggregate revenue pi(x)x is strictly
quasi-concave in x.
Assumption 4 is widely adopted in the literature (see [44]
and the reference therein) and it holds, for example, when all
users have the same type of utility functions chosen from Table
IV (but can still have different parameters). We are ready to
introduce the following lemma:
Lemma 2. A strategy profile q? is a QCE if and only if∑
`∈N q
?
` = Φ
(∑
`∈N q
?
`
)
.
It is straightforward to prove Lemma 2 by comparing the
optimality conditions of (25) and that of each MNO’s best
strategy. Lemma 2 suggests that we can simply characterize
a QCE by a fixed point b? of a one-dimensional mapping
Φ(b).17 Meanwhile, MNO n’s QCE output is q?n = ϕn(b
?).
The continuity of Φ(b) further gives
Proposition 6 (Existence). There always exists a QCE q?.
Such a property is not true for the PCG due to the disconti-
nuity of each MNO’s profit in its strategy, i.e., a slight change
in its pricing may dramatically change an MNO’s profit.
The following proposition characterizes a sufficient condi-
tion where such a QCE is unique:
Proposition 7 (Conditions for Uniqueness). The QCG admits
a unique QCE if there are only two MNOs, i.e., |N | = 2.
We prove Proposition 7 by showing that a two-MNO sys-
tem satisfies the diagonal-dominance condition in [40], under
which it guarantees the uniqueness.
The following theorem shows the equivalent relation be-
tween the multi-operator PCE for the PCG and the QCE.
Theorem 4 (Equivalence). A multi-operator PCE is a QCE
(as  approaches 0). Mathematically, if there exists a multi-
operator PCE h? of the PCG, then there exists a QCE q?
such that q?n =
∑
i∈In
∑
j∈I xi←j(h
?) for all n ∈ N .
Theorem 4 indicates that the QCG is a good approximation
to the PCG.18 Intuitively, an MNO’s strategy space in a PCG
16The mapping ϕn(b) is a (one-to-one) function because the objective in
(25) is strictly quasi-concave for any given b.
17This differs substantially from the general I-player game, in which case
we need to characterize an equilibrium by a fixed point of a mapping with at
least I dimensions in general.
18The equivalence result in Theorem 4 is interesting since it differs from
the existing result for the classical models and those for many variations.
That is, the pricing competition (or the Bertrand competition) and quantity
competition (or the Cournot competition) typically lead to different outcomes
in general (e.g., [41], [42]).
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Algorithm 2: Computation of the QCE
Input : Φ(·) in (26)
Output: QCE quantity q?
1 Initialize the iteration index t← 0, a stopping criteria
 > 0, and a convergence flag Conv flag← 0, and
randomly picks a b(0) ∈ [0,∑`∈In C`];
2 while Conv flag = 0 do
3 t← t+ 1;
4 MNO k computes
b(t+ 1) = (1/t)Φ(b(t)) + (1− 1/t)b(t); (27)
if |b(t)− Φ(b(t))| ≤ b(t) then
5 Conv flag← 1;
6 end
7 end
8 Compute the QCE output level q?n = ϕn(b
?) using (25);
possesses more dimensions than that in a QCG. Hence, if
MNO n cannot achieve a higher profit by changing its pricing
strategy in a PCG, nor can it find a more profitable quantity
strategy in a QCG. Note that A QCE may not be a multi-
operator PCE, because a QCE always exists (Proposition 6)
but a multi-operator PCE may not.
C. Algorithm
Due to the difficulty of expressing the QCE in a closed
form, we further design a simple and convergent algorithm to
compute the QCE.
We compute the QCE based on the Mean-Value Iterative
Dynamics [43], which essentially computes a fixed point of
Φ(b), as summarized in Algorithm 2. The key step of this
algorithm is in (27), which is to average b(t) of all previous t
iterations and let mean value be the input at iteration t+1. The
above algorithm leads to the following convergence property.
Proposition 8. Algorithm 2 converges to a QCE q?.
The proof mainly relies on [43], which proved that the
Mean-Value Iterative Dynamics is convergent for computing a
fixed point of a continuous and compact self-mapping. We note
that the convergence result does not require the uniqueness of
the QCE, as shown in [43].19
D. Summary of the Competitive Scheme
We summarize the competitive pricing scheme in Algorithm
3. Specifically, we first check whether there exists a single-
operator PCE for the PCG by Proposition 3. If so, Algorithm
3 returns the single-operator PCE through the PCG. If not, we
adopt Algorithm 2 to compute the QCE as an approximation
to a multi-operator PCE.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we perform numerical studies to evaluate
the performances of the proposed schemes (the cooperative
19Such property differs from the widely considered best response dynamics
analyzed in [40], of which the convergence requires the uniqueness of the
equilibrium in general.
Algorithm 3: The Competitive Hybrid Pricing
Input : {ϕn(·)}n∈N , {e˜j}j∈I , {di(·)}i∈I , {Cj}j∈I
Output: Equilibrium hybrid price matrix h?
1 if There is a single-operator PCE (ζgthr−1 ≤ e˜gthr )
according to Proposition 3 then
2 Compute PCE delivered prices p? by (19);
3 else
4 Compute QCE q? by Algorithm 2;
5 Compute the delivered pricing by p?i = pi
(∑
n∈N q
?
n
)
for all i ∈ I
6 end
7 Compute the hybrid pricing h? from (18);
pricing scheme, the competitive pricing scheme, and the FT
scheme) compared with two benchmarks, and study the impact
of network heterogeneity on their performances.
A. Benchmarking Schemes
We consider two benchmarking schemes, namely the no-
tethering pricing scheme and the social welfare maximization
scheme for comparison.
1) No-Tethering Pricing (NTP): For the NTP scheme,
MNOs do not allow tethering (which is equivalent to set ti←j
to be infinity for all i 6= j, i, j ∈ I) and then optimize the
access prices by maximizing their own profits.
2) Social Welfare Maximization (SWM): Before we intro-
duce the SWM scheme, we first define the social welfare as
the aggregate payoff of all MNOs and all users, denoted by
Ψ(x) =
∑
i∈I
Ui (x)−
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I
e˜i←jxi←j . (28)
The SWM scheme is to maximize the social welfare Ψ(x)
subject to the capacity constraints
∑
i∈I xi←j ≤ Cj , ∀j ∈ I
and non-negative constraints xi←j ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ I.
B. Simulation Setup
We perform numerical studies for an MCA involving |N | =
2 MNOs20 and |I| = 10 users and study their interactions for
T = 10 minutes. We randomly select 5 users as the subscribers
of MNO 1 and the remaining 5 users as the those of MNO 2.
Truncated Normal Distributions: We assume that users’ util-
ity parameters, downlink capacities Ci, and operational costs
ei follow the respective i.i.d. truncated normal distributions.
Let TN(µ, κ2) denote a truncated normal distribution over
the interval [µ− 2κ2, µ+ 2κ2], with µ being the mean and κ2
being the variance.
Parameter Settings: We consider the following parameter
settings unless stated otherwise. Each user i has the weighted
α-fair utility function Ui(x) = θix1−α/(1 − α), where
α = 0.4. We set θi ∈ TN(550, 200). We consider two
types of users including 3G users and LTE users. We select
a user as a LTE user with a probability of ρLTE and a 3G
user with a probability of 1 − ρLTE. We set ρLTE = 40%.
LTE downlinks have relatively higher capacities and incur
20The two-MNO setting is a reasonable consideration and has been widely
adopted in the literature (e.g. [45]).
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Fig. 7. Performance comparison of the proposed schemes against two
benchmarks for (a) α-fair utility and (b) logarithmic utility.
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Fig. 8. MNOs’ profit (a) and users’ payoff (b) versus the value of s, where
s is the mean of downlink capacity for LTE users.
lower operational costs than the 3G downlinks [46]–[48].
Specifically, the downlink capacity (in terms of Mbps) dis-
tributions for LTE downlinks and 3G downlinks are CLTE ∼
TN(14, 3) and C3G ∼ TN(1, 0.3), respectively. We choose
the average speed according to field experiments [46], [47].
The operational cost distributions for LTE downlinks and 3G
downlinks are eLTE ∼ TN(80, 10) and e3G ∼ TN(350, 40),
respectively, suggested in [48]. Each user experiences the
same cellular energy cost and zero Wi-Fi energy cost, and
we set ci = 7.5 [28]. We run the experiment 10,000 times for
each (ρLTE, {θi}i∈I , {Ci}i∈I , {ei}i∈I , {In}n∈N ) realization
and show the average together with the error bars.
C. Results
1) Performance Comparison: In this part, we compare the
performances of the cooperative scheme (denoted by COOP),
competitive (denoted by COMP), and the FT scheme with the
two benchmarks. We study both an α-fair utility scenario and
a logarithmic utility scenario.
We first consider the α-fair utility scenario. We plot the
users’ payoff, MNOs’ profit, and the social welfare for users
in Fig. 7(a). First, we observe that the cooperative scheme
approximately doubles both MNOs’ profit, compared with the
NTP scheme. Comparing with the cooperative scheme, the
competitive scheme only incurs a slight MNOs’ profit loss. For
the FT scheme, we see that it achieves exactly the same perfor-
mance as the cooperative scheme. This agrees with Corollary
2, i.e., the iso-elasticity of the α-fair utility functions, zero
Wi-Fi links energy costs eWi-Fii←j , and homogeneous cellular
downlink energy costs eDownj lead to the optimum.
We observe a similar trend for the users’ payoff. Namely,
both cooperative and competitive schemes approximately dou-
ble both users’ payoff, compared with the NTP scheme. The
competitive scheme achieves a relatively higher users’ payoff
compared with the cooperative scheme.
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Fig. 9. MNOs’ profit versus (a) the percentage of the LTE users and (b) the
ratio of the means of LTE operational cost and 3G operational cost (the LTE
operational cost distribution eLTE ∼ TN(η × 350, η × 40)).
In terms of the social welfare, we observe that the coop-
erative and competitive schemes perform better than the NTP
scheme. Moreover, the competitive scheme achieves 28% more
social welfare than the cooperative scheme. Intuitively, the
competitive MNOs compete down the hybrid prices so that
the achieved social welfare is closer to the SWM scheme.
To conclude,
Observation 1. Compared with the conventional NTP scheme,
in the α-fair utility setting, both competitive and cooperative
schemes can approximately double both MNOs’ profit and
users’ payoff.
We then study the logarithmic utility scenario. Each user
has a utility given by Ui(x) = θi log(1 + x) with θi ∼
TN(550, 200). The cooperative scheme approximately dou-
bles the MNOs’ profit compared with the FT scheme, while
the competitive scheme decreases the MNOs’ profit compared
with the cooperative scheme. A key observation is that the FT
scheme perform close to the optimal and can achieve 97.5%
of the maximal MNOs’ profit. Therefore, we highlight
Observation 2. The FT scheme performs close to the optimal
cooperative scheme with low tethering energy cost and homo-
geneous cellular energy cost, even without isoelastic utility.
In terms of users’ payoff, the cooperative scheme ap-
proximately doubles the NTP scheme’s performance. The
competitive scheme further improves the performance of the
cooperative scheme by 88%.
2) Impact of Network Heterogeneity: We next perform
three sets of experiments to investigate how the performance
benefits of the MCA service depend on the network het-
erogeneity. Specifically, heterogeneities are in terms of the
downlink capacity, the portion of LTE users, and the MNOs’
operational cost.
Downlink capacity: For the first experiment, we fix the
mean of LTE downlink to be s Mbps and the 3G downlinks
to be 1 Mbps. Fig. 8(a) shows that, as the capacities of the low-
cost LTE channels increase, the MNOs’ profit benefits of the
cooperative and competitive schemes over the NTP scheme
become more significant. Precisely, when s = 25 Mbps,
compared with the conventional NTP scheme, the cooperative
and the competitive schemes improve the MNOs’ profit by
125% and 101%, respectively. This is because, in the proposed
schemes, users prioritize the channels of low operational costs.
Hence, the capacity increase of these channels will reduce the
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MNOs’ operational costs and thus the delivered prices to users.
Fig. 8(b) shows that compared with the conventional NTP
scheme, the cooperative and the competitive schemes’ im-
provements increase in s and can improve the users’ payoff by
95% and 148%, respectively, when s = 25 Mbps. On the other
hand, comparing with the cooperative scheme, the competitive
scheme also achieves a substantial gain up to 27% in term of
users’ payoff when s is large whereas the loss in MNOs’ profit
is relatively small. This mainly results from the larger social
welfare achieved by the competitive scheme.
In the following, we will study the performances in terms
of MNOs’ profit. The results in terms of users’ payoff for the
next two sets of experiments are similar to the first set. We thus
present the numerical results for users’ payoff in Appendix U.
Percentage of LTE users: Fig. 9(a) shows a similar trend
regarding the network heterogeneity in terms of the percentage
of LTE users. As shown in Fig. 9(a), when the percentage of
LTE users is between 20%-60%, the cooperative and com-
petitive schemes’ benefits in terms of MNOs’ profits increase
are large, compared with the NTP scheme. When users are
all LTE users or all 3G users, however, the NTP scheme
achieves higher MNOs’ profits than the competitive scheme.
This implies that when users are homogeneous, each MNO’s
profit gained from the MCA due to resource pooling is limited
while the competitive MNOs also suffer from the additional
competition enabled by the MCA.
LTE operational cost: Finally, we study the LTE opera-
tional cost’s impact on performance in Fig. 9(b). Specifically,
we consider an operational cost ratio η ∈ [0, 1] and set
eLTE ∼ TN(η × 350, η × 40). Therefore, the a larger η leads
to a more similar LTE operational cost to the 3G operational
cost. We show that as η increases, MNOs’ profit improvements
for both proposed schemes decrease compared with the NTP
scheme in Fig. 9(b). To summarize, we have
Observation 3. The degree of network heterogeneity increases
the performance improvement of both cooperative and com-
petitive schemes, comparing with the NTP scheme.
Observation 4. Compared to the cooperative scheme, the
competitive scheme achieves a slightly smaller MNOs’ profit
but a significantly larger users’ payoff, in heterogeneous
networks.
As today’s wireless networks are becoming increasingly
heterogeneous due to the coexistence of legacy and new
technologies, we believe that the MCA with the proposed
pricing schemes will be beneficial to both MNOs and users.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a hybrid pricing framework for
the mobile collaborative Internet access and studied both coop-
erative and competitive interactions among MNOs. We showed
that there exists an equilibrium hybrid pricing scheme making
each user’s cost independent of the selection of tethering links,
for both cooperative and competitive scenarios. We verified
that the proposed cooperative and competitive pricing schemes
improve MNOs’ profit and users’ payoff as compared with
the no-tethering scheme in practically interesting scenarios.
Moreover, the performance gain increases when the network
becomes more diverse. Our results also showed that, under
some mild conditions, it is possible to achieve most of the
benefits of MCA without imposing additional fees on user
tethering. This result is encouraging, as it allows the MNOs
to improve their profits (compared to no tethering case) even
if they are prohibited from charging for tethering [11].
For the future work, we are particularly interested in study-
ing the impact of incomplete information, where the users’
utility functions and topology are private information. Another
promising direction is to implement the proposed schemes
in systems. Inspired by TUBE in [49], one approach is to
design an architecture solution that contains not only the MCA
function but also a feedback loop between the MNOs’ hybrid
price computation and users, which will facilitate MNOs to
implement the adaptive and topology-based pricing.
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APPENDIX
A. KKT conditions and Lemma 3
We characterize the optimal solution x∗(h) to (UPM) in (5)
for any given h in the following. Due to the concavity of the
objective and the convexity of the constraint set, (UPM) is a
convex problem. It is easy to verify that it also satisfies the
Slater’s condition, and hence the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions are sufficient and necessary for global optimality
[33]: for every user i,
U ′i
(∑
l∈I
xi←l
)
− hi←j − ci←j − λj + µi←j = 0, ∀j, (29a)
λj
(∑
i∈I
xi←j − Cj
)
= 0, ∀j, (29b)
xi←jµi←j = 0, ∀j, (29c)
λi ≥ 0, (29d)
µi←j ≥ 0, ∀j, (29e)
Based on the KKT conditions in (29), we have the following
lemma for facilitating the following analysis.
Lemma 3. Given any hybrid pricing matrix h and hi←k +
ci←k > hi←j + ci←j , the optimal traffic matrix x∗ satisfies
x∗i←k > 0 only if
∑
l∈I
x∗l←j = Cj . (30)
Intuitively, users purchase the data from the downlink with
a lower hybrid price first (and fully utilize that downlink’s
capacity) before purchasing data from a higher price downlink.
Proof: When hi←j + ci←j < hi←k + ci←j , by (29a), we
have:
λ∗j − µ∗i←j > λ∗k − µ∗i←k. (31)
When x∗i←k > 0, combining (29c)-(29e) and (31), we have
λ∗j > λ
∗
k + µ
∗
i←j ≥ 0, (32)
which indicates that
∑
i∈I x
∗
i←j −Cj = 0 according to (29b).
B. Proof of Theorem 1
We prove Theorem 1 for both cooperative and competitive
MNOs, respectively.
1) Cooperative MNOs: Suppose that, given h∗, there exists
an optimal solution {x∗,µ∗,λ∗} (that satisfies the KKT
conditions) with λ∗j > 0 for some downlink j ∈ I. In this case
we can see that if MNOs increase h∗i←j to h
′
i←j , h∗i←j +λ∗j
for all i ∈ I, the solution {x∗,µ∗,λ′ , 0} will still satisfy
the KKT conditions under the updated price, implying that it
is an optimal solution under the updated price. Furthermore,
Assumption 1 implies that the resulted total MNOs’ profit is
unique in h. Hence, the MNOs’ profit increases from∑
j∈I
∑
i∈I
(h∗i←j − ej)x∗i←j
to ∑
j∈I
∑
i∈I
(h′i←j − ej)x∗i←j ,
which implies that h∗ is not the equilibrium (best) price
matrix for the MNOs. Hence, we can see that under the
equilibrium price matrix h∗, the optimal solution {x∗,µ∗,λ∗}
must satisfy λ∗i = 0 for all i ∈ I.
2) Competitive MNOs: Similar to the cooperative case, let
λ?j > 0 for some downlink j ∈ I. In this case we can see
that if MNO σ(j) increase h?i←j to h
′
i←j , h?i←j + λ?j for all
i ∈ I. Furthermore, the resulted MNO σ(j)’s profit increases
from ∑
k∈Iσ(j)
∑
i∈I
(h?i←k − ek)x?i←j
to ∑
k∈Iσ(j)
∑
i∈I
(h′i←k − ek)x?i←j ,
which implies that h? is not at the equilibrium price matrix
for the MNOs. This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Corollary 1
We prove by construction. We define ρi←j , hi←j + ci←j
for notational simplification. According to Theorem 1, there
exists an equilibrium such that λ∗ = 0. For each user i,
• Suppose x∗i←j = 0 for all users j. Let k =
arg maxj ρi←j . Then we let h′i←j ← ρi←k − ci←j for
all j ∈ I and the µ′i←j ← ρi←k−ρi←j for all j ∈ I. We
see that the new solution still satisfies the KKT conditions
in (29a)-(29e). After such an operation, ρi←j = ρi←l, for
all j, l ∈ I, x∗ is still the optimal traffic solution, and
each MNO’s profit maintains the same.
• Suppose there exists a user j such that x∗i←j > 0. Note
that any other k such that x∗i←k > 0, it also satisfies
that ρi←j = ρi←k due to (29a). For the remaining k
such that x∗i←k = 0, let h
′
i←k ← hi←k − µi←k and the
µ′i←k ← 0. Hence, h′i←k + ci←k = ρi←j . We see that
the new solution also still satisfies the KKT conditions
in (29a)-(29e). After such an operation, ρi←j = ρi←l for
all j, l ∈ I, x∗ is still the optimal traffic solution, and
each MNO’s profit maintains the same.
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Therefore, we note that for any equilibrium (h∗,x∗), we can
always construct another h˜ such that for each user i, h˜i←j +
ci←j = h˜i←k + ci←k, for all j, k ∈ I, x∗ is still the optimal
traffic solution, and each MNO’s profit maintains the same.
Hence, there always exists such a pricing h˜ that is the optimal
cooperative pricing scheme.
D. Proof of Proposition 1
We will prove that U ′i(0) > minj [ci←j + ej ] is both
sufficient and necessary for user i to have a positive demand
at an equilibrium.
Necessity: Suppose that, for user i, we have U ′i(0) ≤
minl[ci←l + el]. By the KKT conditions in (29a), for every
downlink j, we have
µi←j = −U ′i
(∑
l
x∗i←l
)
+ λj + ci←j + h∗i←j ,
(a)
≥ −U ′i
(∑
l
x∗i←l
)
+ ci←j + ej ,
(b)
> −U ′i(0) + min
l
[ci←l + el],
≥ 0. (33)
Inequality (a) is because the equilibrium hybrid price h∗i←j
should be no less than the operational cost and λj ≥ 0.
Inequality (b) is because of the strict concavity of Ui(·) from
Assumption 1. We further see x∗i←j = 0 for all j ∈ I (user i
has zero demand) due to (33) and the complementary slackness
condition xi←jµi←j = 0. This proves the necessity.
Sufficiency: As Proposition 1 suggests, we focus on the
gateway-independent delivered pricing scheme {pi}i∈I . As we
previously discussed, each user’s traffic at the equilibrium can
be fully characterized by a delivered price pi. When U ′i(0) >
minj [ci←j + ej ], there exists an arbitrarily small  such that
under an delivered price vector p = {pi = U ′i(0) − }i∈I ,
each user i demands a small amount of data. In this case, user
i requests data from downlink j∗ with the lowest delivered
cost, i.e., j∗ = minj e˜i←j by Assumption 1. This leads to the
positive (though small) total MNOs’ profit. Hence, the optimal
delivered price p∗i for each user i should yield the profit no
less than that of {pi = U ′i(0)−}i∈I , in which case each user
should also have a positive demand. Hence, under MNOs’
optimal pricing scheme, MNOs’ profit gained from each user
is positive which only happens if each user i has a positive
demand.
E. Proof of Theorem 2
To prove Theorem 2, we first introduce an intermediate
transformation of (OPM) and then prove the equivalence
between the transformation and the (R-OPM).
1) Transformed OPM (T-OPM): Let h(p) , {hi←j =
pi − ci←j}i,j∈I be the hybrid price matrix associated with
the delivered price vector p.
We reformulate (OPM) as
(T−OPM) max
p
∑
i∈I
di(pi)pi −
∑
j∈I
∑
i∈I
e˜i←jx∗i←j(h(p)),
(34a)
s.t. pi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I. (34b)
Assumption 1 ensures that users select x∗ from X o to min-
imize the aggregate delivered cost
∑
j∈I
∑
i∈I e˜i←jxi←j in
(34). In addition, since di(pi) is a (one-to-one) function and
users select x∗ according to Assumption 1, the objective
in (34) has a unique maximum. Based on the gateway-
independent pricing structure in Corollary 1, we have
Proposition 9 (Equivalence of (OPM) and (T-OPM)). For any
optimal solution p∗ to (T-OPM), h∗i←j = p
∗
i + ci←j for all
i, j ∈ I, is the optimal solution to (OPM).
From Proposition 9, we can interpret the delivered cost e˜i←j
as the operational cost for each unit xi←j in analogy with pi
being the unit revenue gained from user i.
The physical interpretation is that we now consider an
equivalent system where MNOs’ operational cost is e˜i←j
for each byte downloaded by user j and tethered to user i
(and there is no energy cost for user). By considering such
an equivalent system, MNOs are able to optimize over the
effective price vector p˜.
2) Equivalence between (T-OPM) and (R-OPM) : Let ν∗1
be the optimal value of (T-OPM) and ν∗2 be that of (R-OPM).
We will prove ν∗1 = ν
∗
2 by first showing ν
∗
1 ≤ ν∗2 and then
showing ν∗1 ≥ ν∗2 . And then we show statements i) and ii).
Let p∗ be the optimal solution to (T-OPM). Note that users’
decision x∗(h(p∗)) is a feasible solution to (R-OPM), since
(R-OPM) and (UPM) share the same constraints. Given p∗,
the objective value of (R-OPM) can be expressed by
ν2(x
∗(h(p∗)))
=
∑
j∈I
∑
i∈I
U ′i
∑
j∈I
x∗i←j(h(p
∗))
− e˜i←j
x∗i←j(h(p∗))
(a)
=
∑
j∈I
∑
i∈I
[U ′i (di(p
∗
i ))− e˜i←j ]x∗i←j(h(p∗))
(b)
=
∑
i∈I
p∗i di(p
∗
i )−
∑
j∈I
∑
i∈I
e˜i←jx∗i←j(h(p
∗)) = ν∗1 , (35)
where (a) is due to (9) and (b) is because U ′i(·) is the inverse
function of di(·). We have ν∗1 = ν2(x∗(h(p∗))) ≤ ν∗2 .
Next, we prove ν∗2 ≤ ν∗1 . The (R-OPM) Problem can be
equivalently reformulated as
(R−OPM− 2) max
x,y
∑
i∈I
U ′i(yi)yi −
∑
j∈I
∑
i∈I
e˜i←jxi←j
s.t. yi =
∑
j∈I
xi←j ,∀i ∈ I, (36a)∑
j∈I
xi←j ≤ Cj ,∀j ∈ I, (36b)∑
j∈I
xi←j ≥ 0,∀i, j ∈ I. (36c)
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Denote y∗ = {y∗i } as the optimal solution to (R-OPM-2).
Then we can express the optimal solution xR to (R-OPM) as
xR = arg min
x
∑
j∈I
∑
i∈I
e˜i←jxi←j (37)
s.t. (36b), (36c)
y∗i =
∑
j∈I
xi←j ,∀i ∈ I.
Suppose p˜i = U ′i(
∑
i∈I x
R
i←j) = U
′
i(y
∗) for every user i.
Comparing (37) and (6), we can see x∗ = xR under the price
p˜ = {p˜i}i∈I . This indicates that
ν∗2 =
∑
j∈I
∑
i∈I
U ′i
∑
j∈I
xRi←j
− e˜i←j
xRi←j
=
∑
j∈I
∑
i∈I
[U ′i
(
xR
)− e˜i←j ]x∗i←j(U ′i(xR))
= ν1(p˜) ≤ ν∗1 . (38)
That is, p˜ corresponds to a feasible solution to (T-OPM).
Combining the above discussion, we have that ν∗1 = ν
∗
2 .
Hence, p˜ is exactly the optimal solution to (T-OPM), i.e., the
optimal delivered price for user i is
p∗i = U
′
i
∑
j∈I
xRi←j
 , (39)
and xR is the optimal solution to (UPM) under p∗. This
completes the proof of statement i). Moreover, as previously
discussed, the fact that x∗ = xR under the price p˜ = p∗
completes the proof of statement ii).
F. Free-Tethering Pricing Scheme and Proof of Corollary 2
In this subsection, we first elaborate the FT scheme and
then prove Corollary 2.
1) Free-Tethering Pricing Scheme: Define the uniform de-
livered price function as the inverse function of the users’
aggregate demand function, i.e.,
pi (·) =
(∑
i∈I
di(·)
)−1
. (40)
Such a uniform delivered price pi (·) corresponds to a delivered
price that equalizes users’ aggregate demand function and
the total downloads, i.e.,
∑
i∈I di
(
pi
(∑
j∈I
∑
i∈I xi←j
))
=∑
j∈I
∑
i∈I xi←j . Similar to (R-OPM) in (12a)-(12b), we
formulate the (FT) Problem as follows
(FT) max
x
∑
j∈I
∑
i∈I
(
pi
(∑
k∈I
∑
l∈I
xk←l
)
− e˜i←j
)
xi←j
(41a)
s.t.
∑
l∈I
xl←j ≤ Cj ,∀j ∈ I, (41b)
xi←j ≥ 0,∀i, j ∈ I. (41c)
Let xF denote the optimal solution to the above problem. Then
we can write the corresponding FT hybrid price as
hFi←j = pi
(∑
k∈I
∑
l∈I
xFk←l
)
− cDownj , ∀i ∈ I. (42)
Since hFi←j = a
F
j + t
F
i←j , we further have h
F
i←j = a
F
j and
thus tFi←j = 0.
2) Proof of Corollary 2: We first show that the isoelastic
utility functions lead to the same delivered prices across users.
For an ioselastic utility function, the corresponding demand
function is
di(pi) =
(
θi
pi
)1/α
, ∀i ∈ I. (43)
We define user i’s price elasticity of demand as
Ei , ∂di(pi)
∂pi
· pi
di
= − 1
α
, ∀i ∈ I. (44)
We can derive the optimal solution p∗i of (T-OPM) as
p∗i =
e˜kEi
1 + Ei , ∀i ∈ I, (45)
for some downlink k. Since Ei is a constant for every user i,
the optimal delivered prices are the same across users.
Proposition 1 suggests that the optimal hybrid pricing
satisfies
p∗i = a
∗
i + c
Down
i = a
∗
j + t
∗
i←j + c
Down
j + c
Wi-Fi
i←j ,∀i, j ∈ I.
(46)
Hence, when cWi−Fii←j = 0 and c
Down
i = c
Down
j for any i ∈ I,
(46) leads to a∗i = a
∗
j and t
∗
i←j = 0 for all users i and j.
G. Proof of Proposition 2
Let h˜? be an equilibrium price matrix and x? be the
equilibrium traffic matrix under h˜?. We first prove that, for any
h˜?, there always exists a gateway-independent hybrid price
matrix h? that maintains both users’ payoff and MNOs’ profit.
We then show that such a gateway-independent hybrid price
matrix h? is a PCE.
1) Constructing the Gateway-Independent Pricing: By
Theorem 1, we have:
h˜?i←j + cj ≥ U ′i(x?) + µ˜?i←j ,∀i ∈ I,
with µ˜? being the equilibrium dual variables satisfying
µ˜?i←j = 0 if x
?
i←j > 0.
From Assumption 2, at an equilibrium, each user i must
have a positive demand, i.e., x?i←m(i) > 0 must hold for
some m(i) ∈ I. Consider a gateway-independent hybrid price
matrix h? such that, for each user i,
h?i←j + cj = h˜i←m(i) + cm(i) , p?i , ∀j ∈ I. (47)
To show that such a gateway-independent pricing scheme
maintains the same users’ payoff and MNOs’ profits, we
exploit the KKT conditions in (29a)-(29e), which leads to
h?i←j = µ˜
?
i←j + h˜
?
i←j . (48)
18
We can see Vn(h?) = Vn(h˜?) for every MNO n. This is
because, given the price h?, (x?, {µ′i←j = 0}i,j , {λ?j = 0}j)
satisfies the KKT conditions in (29a)-(29e), similar as (x?, µ?,
{λ?j = 0}j) satisfies the same set of KKT conditions under the
price h˜?.
2) Gateway-Independent Hybrid Price Matrix is a PCE:
Next, we show that the gateway-independent hybrid price
matrix h? is an equilibrium by contradiction. Suppose that
for some MNO n, there exists a strategy h′n , {h′i←j}i,j
such that
Vn(h
′
n;h
?
−n) > Vn(h
?
n;h
?
−n). (49)
Let (x′,λ′,µ′) be users’ optimal (primal-dual) decision under
the hybrid price (h′n;h
?
−n), satisfying the KKT conditions:
U ′i(x
′)− h′i←j − cj + λ′j + µ′i←j = 0, if j ∈ In, (50a)
U ′i(x
′)− h?i←j − cj + λ′j + µ′i←j = 0, if j /∈ In. (50b)
The MNO’s corresponding profit is Vn(h′n;h
?
−n) =∑
i∈I
∑
j∈In h
′
i←jx
′
i←j .
If MNO n plays h′n and the remaining MNOs’ strategies
are h˜?−n, users’ (primal-dual) decision (x
′′,λ′′,µ′′) satisfies:
U ′i(x
′′)− h′i←j − cj + λ′′j + µ′′i←j = 0, if j ∈ In, (51a)
U ′i(x
′′)− h˜?i←j − cj + λ′′j + µ′′i←j = 0, if j /∈ In. (51b)
Consider (50a)-(50b) and (48), we see that (x′′,λ′′,µ′′)
satisfies x′′ = x′,λ′′ = λ′, and µ′′i←j = µ
′
i←j if j ∈ In and
µ′′i←j = µ
′
i←j + µ
?
i←j if j /∈ In. Hence, x′ is also the users’
best decision under hybrid price {h′n; h˜?−n}. Hence, it leads to
Vn(h
′
n; h˜
?
−n) =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈In h
′
i←jx
′
i←j = Vn(h
′
n;h
?
−n) >
Vn(h˜
?) = Vn(h˜
?), which contradicts with the fact that h˜? is
at the equilibrium.
Therefore, we proved that the gateway-independent hybrid
price matrix h? in (48) is also at an equilibrium.
H. Proof of Lemma 1
Due to the continuity of Ui(·), there exists a Lipschitz
constant Lc such that,
|Ui(x1)− Ui(x2)| ≤ Lc|x1 − x2|, ∀x1 > 0, x2 > 0. (52)
Therefore, we have
lim
∆x→0
Ui(x+ ∆x)− Ui(x)
∆x
= U ′i(x) ≤ Lc, (53)
i.e., U ′i(x) is bounded for all x > 0. Due to the strict concavity
of Ui(·), U ′i(x) is continuous and strictly decreasing for all
x > 0. The strictly decreasing and bounded U ′i(x) implies that,
for any x > 0, there exists a variable y such that U ′i(x) = y.
Since U ′i(·) is the inverse function of di(·), we have that there
exists a unique y such that di(y) = x, for any x ∈ (0,+∞).
Similarly, there exists a unique ζs such that
∑
i∈I di(ζs) =∑s
`=1 C`, for any
∑s
`=1 C` ∈ (0,+∞). Therefore, we have
shown the existence and uniqueness of ζs for any
∑s
`=1 C`.
I. Proof of Proposition 3
We first prove for the case ζgthr−1 ≤ e˜gthr , it admits only
one traffic-supporting MNO and satisfies p?i ≤ e˜gthr , for all
i ∈ I. Consider the following two subcases:
• Suppose that there exists an gateway-independent equi-
librium delivered price p? with p?i = p
?
j > e˜gthr , for all
i, j ∈ I. The total demand of all users satisfies
∑
i∈I
di (p
?
i )
(b)
<
∑
i∈I
di(e˜gthr)
(c)
≤
gthr−1∑
l=1
Cl, (54)
where (b) is because di(·) is decreasing and (c) holds
due to the case condition ζgthr−1 ≤ e˜gthr . Inequality (54)
implies that users do not fully utilize the first gthr − 1
downlinks. In this case, MNO σ(gthr) can always reduce
its hybrid prices h?i←gthr ← p?i − e˜gthr −  for all users
i, where  > 0 is an arbitrarily small value. The new
hybrid prices can attract downloads on downlink gthr.
Since p?i −  > e˜gthr , this improves MNO gthr’s profit
and contradicts with the fact that p? is the equilibrium.
• Suppose that there exists i such that p?i > e˜gthr and p
?
i 6=
p?j for some j, then:
– if
∑
i∈I x
?
i←gthr < Cgthr , then MNO σ(g
thr) can
always set the price h?i←gthr ← p?i −  to attract
more traffic demand according to Lemma 1, where
 > 0 is arbitrarily small. This increases its profit and
contradicts with the fact that {p?} is the equilibrium.
– if
∑
i∈I x
?
i←gthr = Cgthr and
∑gthr−1
j=1
∑
i∈I x
?
i←j ≤∑gthr−1
j=1 Cj , then MNO σ(1) can always set the
delivered price pi←j ← p?i − e˜i←j −  to attract
more traffic demand, which increases its profit and
contradicts with the fact that p? is at the equilibrium.
Thus, when ζgthr−1 ≤ e˜gthr , any equilibrium must satisfy
p?i,σ(1) ≤ e˜gthr , for all i. In addition, the equilibrium delivered
price is lower than e˜gthr , so that no other MNOs have the
incentive to set an even lower delivered price to compete with
MNO σ(1). Hence, MNO σ(1) is the only traffic-supporting
MNO at any equilibrium.
Next, we prove that when ζgthr−1 > e˜gthr , any equilibrium
must satisfy p?i > e˜gthr , for all i ∈ I by contradiction. Suppose
when ζgthr−1 > e˜gthr , there exists an equilibrium with p?i ≤
e˜gthr for some i then the total demand of all users satisfies
∑
i∈I
di (p
?
i ) ≥
∑
i∈I
di(e˜gthr)>
gthr−1∑
`=1
C`, (55)
which indicates that the users’ total demand exceeds MNO
σ(1)’s first gthr− 1 downlinks and there must be some MNO
n 6= σ(1) serving some users. However, such an MNO n
incurs profit loss, since the delivered price is lower than the
delivered cost for MNO n. Hence, MNO n can always increase
the hybrid prices to avoid such a profit loss, which contradicts
with the fact that p? is an equilibrium.
Therefore, when ζgthr−1 > e˜gthr , any equilibrium must
satisfy p?i > e˜gthr for each user i.
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J. Proof of Proposition 4
As Lemma 3 asserts, when ζgthr−1 ≤ e˜gthr , any equilibrium
pricing profile should p? satisfy p?i ≤ e˜gthr for all i ∈ I and
MNO σ(1) is the only traffic-supporting MNO in this case.
Hence, if the monopolist delivered price p˜∗i < e˜gthr for each
user i, then MNO σ(1)’s best strategy is to set p?i = p˜
?
i , since
the remaining MNOs do not have any incentive to set lower
prices due to their high operational cost.
If MNO σ(1) sets the price pi below e˜gthr for some i, then
it has the incentive to increase pi, since there is no competition
from the remaining MNOs and the monopoly delivered price
p˜?i is higher than e˜g . Hence, at any equilibrium, the only
possible equilibrium price for MNO σ(1) is p?i = e˜gthr for
every user i ∈ I.
K. Proof of Theorem 3
Let Ne = {σ(i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ sˆ} denote the set of all
traffic-supporting MNOs. To prove Proposition 3, we need the
following lemmata.
1) User Independence:
Lemma 4. Any gateway-independent multi-operator equilib-
rium prices p? are user-independent, i.e., p?i = p
?
j for any
users i and j.
Proof: We show this by contradiction. Suppose that the
equilibrium price matrix p?i < p
?
j for some i and j. Suppose
that MNO n is not the only MNO that supports user j’s traffic,
i.e.,
∑
j
∑
l∈I x
?
j←l <
∑
j
∑
l∈In x
?
j←l. It is easy to see, by
setting h?j←k ← p?j − c˜j −  for some k ∈ In, user j will
prioritize the utilization of channel k according to Lemma 4.
It can increase MNO n’s profit and contradicts with the fact
that p? is the equilibrium delivered price. In other words, if the
total received data of the user of higher price is not completely
supported by MNO n, then MNO n can slightly reduce the
price to increase his profit. In this case, to maximize the total
users’ payoff, the user receiving a higher price will decide to
receive all traffic via MNO n’s subscribers. Meanwhile, some
of the remaining users will receive traffic via other MNOs
so that the total downloaded data remains the same. Hence,
MNO n can increase her profit by doing so. This completes
the proof of Lemma 4.
2) Market Clearing Price: We then introduce the following
lemma.
Lemma 5. Any multi-operator equilibrium prices p? clear
the market of first several downlinks, i.e.,
∑
i∈I di(p
?
i ) =∑s
`=1 C` for some s.
Proof: We prove Lemma 5 by contradiction. More specif-
ically, consider that at an equilibrium where
∑s−1
`=1 C` <∑
i∈I di(p
?
i ) <
∑s
`=1 C` for some s. We will show that MNO
σ(s) can always increase its profit by setting a different pricing
scheme. We must have that MNO σ(s)’s channel s is not
fully utilized, because users will utilize the low delivered cost
downlinks first according to Assumption 1. Since MNO σ(s)
is not the only traffic-supporting MNO, there exists an user i
who does not receive the all her data from MNO σ(s), i.e.,∑
i
∑
j∈I x
∗
i←j <
∑
i
∑
j∈Iσ(s) x
?
i←j . In this case, MNO σ(s)
can set hi←s ← p?i − cj − ε for some traffic-supporting MNO
n ∈ Ne. This increases MNO σ(s)’s profit because
• according to Lemma 1, user i will first utilize channel
s, and thus MNO σ(s) can sell additional downloading
data;
• MNO σ(s)’s delivered price is slightly decreased but still
larger than e˜g .
Hence, the fact that MNO σ(s)’s profit increases contradicts
with the fact that p? is at an equilibrium. Hence, any multi-
operator equilibrium satisfies
∑
i di(p
?
i ) =
∑s
i=` C`, i.e.,
p?i = p
?
j = ζs, ∀i, j ∈ I,
where ζs is the market-clearing delivered price defined in
Definition 5.
3) Critical Downlink: We are ready to prove the remaining
part of Theorem 4. According to Lemmata 4 and 5, if s < |I|
and ζs > es+1, given the equilibrium p?, MNO σ(s+ 1) can
set the hybrid price hi←s+1 ← ζs − cs+1 −  for all i ∈ I
to attract more traffic demand
∑
i∈I x
?
i←s+1 > 0, resulting
in a profit increase. Hence, we have: ζs ≤ e˜s+1 if s < |I|.
Note that ζs ≥ e˜s, otherwise MNO σ(s) can properly increase
hi←s for all i ∈ I to discourage user s to download and tether,
which increases MNO σ(s)’s profit. Thus, we can see that s
must satisfy the conditions in (20). In other words, a multi-
operator equilibrium must satisfy:
p?i = p
?
j = ζsˆ, ∀i, j ∈ I. (56)
L. Non-Existence of a Multi-Operator PCE
The following example illustrates that it is possible that a
multi-operator PCE may not exist:
Example 2. Consider an MCA of two users with utility
functions Ui(x) = 4 log(1 + x) for both i ∈ I. User 1
subscribes to MNO 1 and user 2 subscribes to MNO 2. Each
user i has the downlink capacity of Ci = 1 and zero cellular
downlink energy cost. MNOs’ operational costs are e1 = 1
and e2 = 2, respectively.
Note that sˆ = 2 satisfying that 2 = e˜sˆ ≤ ζsˆ = 3.
By Proposition 3, the only possible gateway-independent
equilibrium hybrid prices are hi←j = 3 = ζsˆ for both
i, j ∈ {1, 2}. This leads to users’ traffic decision such that∑
j∈{1,2}
∑
i∈{1,2} xi←1 = 2 and MNO 2’s profit V2 = 1.
Now, consider another hybrid prices hi←1 = 3 for both
i ∈ {1, 2} and hi←2 = 4 for both i ∈ {1, 2}. This leads
to users’ traffic decision such that
∑
i∈{1,2} xi←1 = 1 and∑
i∈{1,2} xi←2 = 3/5 and MNO 2’s profit V2 = 6/5. We
can verify that the first hybrid pricing scheme satisfies (20)
and Proposition 3, which indicates that it is the only possible
gateway-independent pricing profile satisfying the necessary
conditions in Proposition 3. However, by increasing hybrid
prices from 3 to 4, MNO 2 can strictly increase its profit.
Hence, there is no gateway-independent PCE or any arbitrary
PCE according to Proposition 2.
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Fig. 10. Full characterizations (in terms of different capacity combinations)
of the PCE existence conditions for a simple example. There are two MNOs
and two users.
M. Analysis of the Non-Equilibrium Simple Example
In this subsection, we present an illustrative example with
two MNOs and two users. User 1 subscribes to MNO 1 and
user 2 subscribes to MNO 2. We assume that user i’s utility
function is
Ui(·) = θi log
1 + ∑
j∈{1,2}
xi←j
 , ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. (57)
Without loss of generality, we assume and e˜1 < e˜2. We first
characterize the PCE pricing profile (if it exists), and then
present the sufficient and necessary conditions of the existence.
1) PCE Pricing Profile: It follows
• when ζ1 = (θ1 + θ2)/(C1 + 2) ≤ e˜2, Proposition
3 suggests that the single-operator PCE leads to the
gateway-independent pricing strategy, given by
p?i = min{
√
(e1 + c)θi, e˜2}, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, (58)
according to Proposition 4;
• when ζ1 = (θ1 + θ2)/(C1 + 2) > e˜2, the equilibrium
gateway-independent delivered prices {p?i }i=1,2 satisfy
p?i = ζ2 =
θ1 + θ2
C1 + C2 + 2
− c, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, (59)
according to Theorem 3.
Note that Proposition 4 ensures the existence of a single-
operator PCE, but Theorem 3 does not guarantee the existence
of a multi-operator PCE. This motivates us to further charac-
terize the sufficient and necessary conditions of (59) being a
multi-operator PCE.
2) Sufficient and Necessary Conditions of Existence: To
check whether (59) is a PCE (defined in Definition 4), we first
consider the following notations. Let ∆p be the arbitrarily
small price changes for MNO i at (59), ∆dj(∆p) be the
corresponding change in user j’s demand, and ∆Vi(∆p) be
the corresponding change in MNO i’s profit. According to
the definition of the PCE, (59) is an exact PCE if neither of
the MNO can improve its profit by selecting any small price
deviation, i.e.,
∆Vi(∆p) =
∑
j∈{1,2}
(∆dj(∆p)ζ2 + ∆pjdj) ≤ 0, (60)
∀∆p,∀i ∈ {1, 2}.
In order to obtain ∆dj(∆p), we adopt the KKT conditions
to (UPM) in (29a)-(29e) and have that for both j ∈ {1, 2} and
for all i, i¯ ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= i¯
U ′j(dj(ζ2) + ∆dj(∆p))− ζ2 − c−∆pj − λi + µj←i = 0,
(61a)
U ′j(dj(ζ2) + ∆dj(∆p))− ζ2 − c− λi¯ + µj←i¯ = 0,
(61b)
U ′¯j(dj(ζ2) + ∆dj(∆p))− ζ2 − c−∆pj¯ − λi + µj¯←i = 0,
(61c)
U ′¯j(dj(ζ2) + ∆dj(∆p))− ζ2 − c− λi¯ + µj¯←i¯ = 0.
(61d)
Similar to the arguments in the proof of Theorem 1, under the
MNO i’s best decision ∆p∗, the dual variable to downlink i’s
capacity constraint λ∗i = 0. Otherwise, MNO i can also set
∆p′j ← ∆pj + λ∗i to increase its profit.
Without loss of generality, we choose ∆pj < ∆pj¯ . By
(61a)-(61d), we have that µ∗
j←i¯ = 0 and µ
∗¯
j←i = 0.
It follows that
• If dj(ζ2) < Ci¯, then user j cannot fully utilize the
downlink i¯ alone. Hence we have that µ∗¯
j←i¯ = 0. We
have
λ∗¯i = ∆pj¯ . (62)
That is, user j¯ experiences a shadow price equal to ∆pj¯
and her change in demand ∆dj¯ = ∆pj¯
∂dj¯(ζ2)
∂pj¯
. Hence, it
follows that
∆Vi(∆p) =
(
∂dj(ζ2)
∂pj
∆pj
)
(ζ2 − ei) + ∆pjdj
+
(
∂dj¯
∂pj¯
ρ∆pj
)
(ζ2 − ei) + ρ∆pjdj¯ , (63)
where ρ , ∆pj¯/∆pj ∈ (−∞, 1].
• Otherwise, user j can fully utilize the downlink i¯ and we
thus have µ∗¯
j←i¯ > 0 and µ
∗
j←i = 0. In this case, we have
λ∗¯i = ∆pj . (64)
Thus,
∆Vi(∆p) =
(
∂dj(ζ2)
∂pj
+
∂dj¯(ζ2)
∂pj¯
)
∆pj(ζ2 − ei)
+ ∆pjCi. (65)
Combining (60), (63), (65), di(ζ2) = θi/(ζ2 + c) − 1, and
∂dj(ζ2)/∂pj = −θi/(ζ2 +c)2 for the utility in (57), it follows
that the pricing profile in (59) is a multi-operator PCE if and
only if {
eiθ1
ζ22
≤ Ci¯ + 1
ei(θ1+θ2)
ζ22
≤ Ci¯ + 2
∀i, i¯ ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= i¯. (66)
Therefore, we can summarize the above conditions in Fig. 10.
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N. Free-Tethering Competitive Pricing
Similar to Section IV-C, we also derive conditions under
which the gateway-independent PCE h? leads to zero tethering
prices, i.e., t?i←j = 0 for all i, j ∈ I. We summarize the
conditions in the following corollary:
Corollary 3. A PCE leads to zero tethering prices (t?i←j = 0
for all i, j ∈ I) when the following conditions hold
• for a single-operator PCE (ζgthr−1 ≤ e˜gthr): the users’
cellular downlink energy costs are the same, i.e., cDowni =
cDownj for all i, j ∈ I, and users have isoelastic utility
functions.
• for a multi-operator PCE (ζgthr−1 > e˜gthr): a multi-
operator PCE exists and the users’ cellular downlink
energy costs are the same, i.e., cDowni = c
Down
j for all
i, j ∈ I.
For a single-operator PCE, the conditions are the same as
the cooperative pricing scheme, since we obtain these two
pricing schemes in a similar fashion. In addition, different from
Corollary 2, zero-tethering prices at a multi-operator PCE do
not rely on users’ isoelastic utility functions. This is because
the competition among MNOs intrinsically leads to the client-
independent delivered prices, as suggested by Proposition 3.
O. Proof of Theorem 4
We will prove that, when any multi-operator PCE p?
(satisfying p?i = ζsˆ for all i ∈ I), the quantity profile (q?
satisfying q?n =
∑sˆ
`=1,`/∈In C` for all n ∈ N suggested by
Theorem 3) is a QCE. We prove this that by showing that, if
it is impossible to improve an MNO n’s profit by increasing its
pricing strategy in a PCG, and it is also impossible to improve
its profit by changing its quantity strategy in the corresponding
QCG.
1) Characterization of Changes in Users’ Demand: We
first prove the following lemma, which characterizes the small
change of the total users’ demand when an MNO n slightly
changes its hybrid prices:
Lemma 6. At a multi-operator PCE of a PCG described
in Theorem 3, if MNO n increases all its hybrid prices
{h∗i←j}i∈I,j∈In by an arbitrarily small amount ∆p, there is
a decease in total users’ demand of ∆p ·∑i∈I ∂di(ζsˆ)∂p .
Proof: Suppose that MNO n changes its PCE hybrid
prices {h∗i←j}j∈I to {h′i←j}j∈I , where h′i←j = h∗i←j + ∆p
for all i ∈ I, j ∈ In. Through Theorem 3, we have
h∗i←j + cj = ζsˆ for some sˆ. According to Theorem 1 and the
KKT conditions for (UPM) in (29a)-(29e), the users’ optimal
primal-dual solution (x′,λ′) satisfies
d′i =
∑
j∈I
x′i←j , ∀i ∈ I, (67a)
U ′i(di) =
{
ζsˆ + λ
′
j + ∆p, ∀j ∈ In,
ζsˆ + λ
′
j , ∀j /∈ In,
(67b)∑
j∈I
x′i←j ≤ Cj , ∀j ∈ I, (67c)
λ′j =
{
0, ∀j ∈ In,
∆p, ∀j /∈ In.
(67d)
Hence, (67b) and (67d) show that every user experiences a
delivered price increase of ∆p, which implies that
lim
∆p→0
∑
i∈I di(ζsˆ + ∆p)−
∑
i∈I di(ζsˆ)
∆p
=
∑
i∈I
∂di(ζsˆ)
∂p
.
(68)
This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
2) Characterization of the QCE: We now prove the remain-
ing part of Theorem 4. To show {q?n}n∈N is the QCE of the
QCG, it is sufficient to show
∂(q?npi(q
?))
∂qn
=pi
(
sˆ∑
`=1
C`
)
+ q?n
∂pi(q?)
∂qn
{
≥ e˜i, ∀i ≤ sˆ,
≤ e˜i, ∀i > sˆ.
(69)
Note that we have pi
(∑sˆ
`=1 C`
)
= ζsˆ, e˜sˆ ≤ ζsˆ ≤ e˜sˆ+1, and
z?i = 0 for all i > sˆ due to Proposition 4. Hence, (69) holds
for all i > sˆ.
3) A Multi-operator PCE is a QCE: Next, we will prove
that (69) holds for all cases of i ≤ sˆ. Since at a multi-operator
PCE of the PCG, no MNO can increase its profit by changing
the prices. Thus, since any MNO n cannot improve its profit
by increasing its equilibrium hybrid prices by an arbitrarily
small amount of ∆p, Lemma 6 yields: for all i ≤ sˆ
∂[(p− e˜i)(
∑
`∈I d`(·)−
∑sˆ
`=1,`/∈In C`)]
∂p
∣∣∣
p=ζsˆ
=
∑
`≤sˆ,`∈In
C` +
∑
`∈I
∂ (d`(ζsˆ))
∂p
(ζsˆ − e˜i) ≤ 0. (70)
By Proposition 4, it follows that
∑
`≤sˆ,`∈In C` = q
?
n. Multi-
plying both sides of (70) by ∂pi(·)/∂qn, we have:
q?n
∂pi(·)
∂qn
+
∑
`∈I
∂d`(·)
∂p
∂pi(·)
∂qn
(p− e˜i) ≥ 0, ∀i ≤ sˆ. (71)
Note that∑
`∈I
∂d`(·)
∂p
(
∂pi(·)
∂(
∑
`∈I d`(·))
∂(
∑
`∈I d`(·))
∂qn
)
=
∑
`∈I
∂d`(·)
∂p
∂pi(·)
∂qn
=1, (72)
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Fig. 11. Comparison of the first order and second order derivatives of
the piece-wise linear cost function En(qn) and its smoothed approximation
E˜n(qn).
because
∑
`∈I d`(·) is the inverse function of pi(·). Combining
(71) and (72), we have, for all users i ≤ sˆ,
∂(qnpi(q
?))
∂qn
= pi
(
sˆ∑
`=1
C`
)
+ q?n
∂pi(q?)
∂qn
≥ e˜i .
Therefore, no MNO can improve its profit by changing its
quantity strategy when all MNO n’s quantity strategy is q?n =∑sˆ
`=1,`/∈In C`. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
P. Proof of Proposition 5
To prove Proposition 5, let Game A denote the QCG where
MNOs have smoothed operational cost functions E˜n(qn) in
(22), where ε is the term with an arbitrary small value.
Let Game B denote the QCG with MNOs having the non-
smoothed operational cost function En(qn) in (21).21 We then
define
ϕn(c) , arg max
qn∈Qn
[qnpi(b) + q
2
n/2pi
′(b)− En(qn)],
and
ϕ˜n(c, ε) , arg max
qn∈Qn
[qnpi(b) + q
2
n/2pi
′(b)− E˜n(qn, ε)].
Next, we prove the limit of ϕ˜n(c, ε) as ε approaches 0 is
ϕn(c). Finally, we prove that the limit of a QCE of Game A
is a QCE of Game B.
1) The Limit of ϕ˜n(c, ε): By the maximum theorem, since
qnpi(qn+ q−n)− E˜n(qn, ε) is strictly quasi-concave in qn and
Qn is convex for all ε, ϕ˜n(c, ε) is continuous in ε. Since both
Game A and Game B satisfy the unimodal condition in [44],
21Fig. 11 demonstrates the difference between En(qn) in (21) and E˜n(qn)
in (22).
functions ϕ˜n(c, ε) and ϕn(c) are unique-valued, for any c and
ε. The continuity of ϕ˜n(c, ε) leads to
lim
ε→0
ϕ˜n(c, ε)
= lim
ε→0
arg max
qn∈Qn
[qnpi(b) + q
2
n/2pi
′(b)− E˜n(qn, ε)]
= arg max
qn∈Qn
[qnpi(b) + q
2
n/2pi
′(b)− lim
ε→0
E˜n(qn, ε)]
= ϕn(c). (73)
2) The limit of a QCE of Game A: In Game A, there always
exists a QCE (by Proposition 6). Lemma 2 suggests that q˜∗(ε)
is a QCE of Game A if and only if there exists c˜∗(ε) such
that ∑
n∈N
q˜n(ε) = c˜
∗(ε) =
∑
n∈N
ϕ˜n (c˜
∗(ε), ε) (74)
and
q˜∗n(ε) = ϕ˜n (c˜
∗(ε), ε) , ∀n ∈ N . (75)
That is, c˜∗(ε) is a fixed point of
∑
n∈N ϕ˜n∈N (c˜
∗(ε), ε). It
follows that
lim
ε→0
c˜∗(ε) = lim
ε→0
∑
n∈N
ϕ˜n
(
lim
ε→0
c˜∗(ε), ε
)
(a)
=
∑
n∈N
ϕn(lim
ε→0
c˜∗ (ε)) ,
(76)
where equality (a) is due to (73). Therefore, Lemma 2 and
(76) imply that limε→0 c˜∗(ε) is a fixed point of
∑
n∈N ϕn(·)
and q∗ is a QCE of Game B, where
q∗n = ϕn
(
lim
ε→0
c˜∗(ε)
)
, ∀n ∈ N . (77)
This completes the proof.
Q. Proof for Lemma 2
By (23) and the strict quasi-concavity of each MNO’s profit,
q? is a QCE if and only if, for every MNO n, the following
KKT conditions are satisfies:
pi
(∑
`∈N
q`
)
+ qnpi
′
(∑
`∈N
q`
)
− E˜′n(qn)− λˆn + µˆn = 0, (78a)
λˆn
(
qn −
∑
`∈In
C`
)
= 0, (78b)
µˆnqn = 0. (78c)
The KKT conditions of x = ϕn(b) lead to, for every MNO n,
pi (b) + xpi′ (b)− E˜′n(x)− λ˜n + µ˜n = 0, (79a)
λ˜n
(
x−
∑
`∈In
C`
)
= 0, (79b)
µ˜nx = 0. (79c)
Therefore, comparing (78) to (79), we can see q? is a QCE
if and only if q?n = ϕn(
∑
l q
?
l ). This happens if and only if∑
l q
?
l = Φ(
∑
l q
?
l ).
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R. Proof of Proposition 6
We use the Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem to prove the
existence of variable b such that b = Φ(b). To do this, we
will prove that (i) Φ(b) is continuous on
[
0,
∑
i∈I Ci
]
and
(ii) Φ(b) maps
[
0,
∑
i∈I Ci
]
into itself.
1) Continuity of Φ(b): Define fn(b) , xpi(b)+x2pi′(b)/2−
E˜n(x) for all n ∈ N . Function fn(b) is continuous because
(i) pi(·) is continuous, which is because its inverse function
D(·) = ∑i∈I di(·) is continuous; (ii) pi′(·) = 1/(∑i∈I d′i(·))
is continuous; and (iii) E˜′n(x) is continuous due to the
smoothed approximation.
By the maximum theorem, if fn(b) is continuous in b and
strictly concave in x, then ϕ(b) is continuous in b. Therefore,
ϕn(b) is continuous.
2) Function Φ(b) is Self-Mapping: Recall that ϕn(b) is
lower-bounded by 0 and upper-bounded by
∑
`∈In C`, which
ensures that 0 ≤ Φ(b) ≤∑`∈I C`. This indicates that Φ(b) is
a mapping that maps [0,
∑
`∈I C`] into itself.
Combining the above discussions, we conclude that there
exists a b ∈ [0,∑`∈I C`] such that b = Φ(b) by Brouwer’s
fixed-point theorem.
S. Proof for Proposition 7
According to [40], for a game where each player’s payoff
is concave and continuous in its strategy and continuous in
others’ strategies, there exists a unique QCE if
− ∂
2Vn
∂q2n
(q) >
∑
n¯ 6=n
∣∣∣ ∂2Vn¯
∂qn∂qn¯
(q)
∣∣∣, ∀n ∈ N . (80)
If there are only two MNOs, we have
−∂
2Vn
∂q2n
= −qn ∂
2pi
∂q2n
− 2 ∂pi
∂qn
+
∂2E˜n
∂q2n
, ∀n ∈ {1, 2}, (81)∣∣∣ ∂2Vn¯
∂qn∂qn¯
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣− qn ∂2pi
∂q2n
− ∂pi
∂qn
∣∣∣, ∀n ∈ {1, 2}. (82)
Since pi(x)x is quasi-concave, pi(x) is twice continuously
differentiable and decreasing, and E˜n is twice continuously
differentiable and convex, we see that (80) always holds, and
thus the game with two MNOs admits a unique QCE.
T. Proof for Proposition 8
According to [43], Algorithm 2 converges to the fixed point
of f(x) if (i) f(x) is continuous and (ii) f(x) maps [0, 1] into
itself. Note that Φ(b) maps [0,
∑
i∈I Ci] into itself, and we
can normalize the input and output Φ(b) to satisfy condition
(ii). We have already proved these two properties in Appendix
R.
U. Supplementary Numerical Results
In this subsection, we will study the performances in terms
of users’ payoff for the next two sets of experiments.
Percentage of LTE users: Fig. 12(a) shows a similar trend
regarding the network heterogeneity in terms of the percentage
of LTE users. As shown in Fig. 9(a), when the percentage
of LTE users is between 20%-60%, the cooperative schemes’
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Fig. 12. Users’ profit versus (a) the percentage of the LTE users and (b) the
ratio of the means of LTE operational cost and 3G operational cost (the LTE
operational cost distribution eLTE ∼ TN(η × 350, η × 40)).
benefits in terms of users’ payoff increases are large, compared
with the NTP scheme. However, when the percentage is 0%
or 100%, the benefit in terms of the users’ payoff is small,
compared with the NTP scheme. This implies that when users
are homogeneous, each users’ payoff gained from the MCA
due to resource pooling is limited. The competitive MNOs
further improves the the users’ payoff.
LTE operational cost: Finally, we study the LTE opera-
tional cost’s impact on users’ payoff in Fig. 12(b). Specifically,
we consider an operational cost ratio η ∈ [0, 1] and set
eLTE ∼ TN(η × 350, η × 40). Therefore, a larger η leads to
a LTE operational cost closer to the 3G operational cost. We
show that as η increases, users’ payoff improvements for both
proposed schemes decrease, compared with the NTP scheme
in Fig. 9(b).
